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From the Director . . .
This year marks the 37th year the Center for Business
and Economic Research (CBER) has published the
Kentucky Annual Economic Report. This report is one of
the important ways that the Center fulfills its mandated
mission to examine various aspects of the Kentucky
economy. The 2009 report contains six articles. These
articles cover a wide variety of topics from the expected
growth of Kentucky and the national economy to the
examination of citizens’ preferences for the state budget.
As we have done in previous years in this annual report,
we focus on important issues that face citizens and policy
makers in the state such as: the 2008 financial crisis,
differences in income between rural and urban portions
of the state, and manufacturers’ attitudes toward the
future.
In putting together this issue, we have drawn on the
expertise of the faculty, staff and former graduate students
at the University of Kentucky. Contributors include six
UK faculty members, an economic analyst, and a former
graduate student who is now a faculty member at Valdosta
State University. As has been the tradition for this report,
we have assembled some of the best economists in the state
to write about important regional and national issues.
Our lead article is by Dr. Donald J. Mullineaux, a
Professor of Finance. His article discusses the causes and
consequences of the 2008 financial crisis, with a particular
emphasis on the role of innovations in the financial sector.
Dr. Mullineaux discusses how the financial situation
grew from a small problem to a large one and whether
the situation could have been avoided. He also provides
comments on the initial policy responses to the crisis.
I contributed an article that looks back at the
performance of the national and state economies over the
recent period and provides forecasts for the coming year.
My forecast for the U.S. is that the economy will contract by
0.5 percent for all of 2009, that unemployment will average
8 percent for the year—which would be the highest rate
since the 1982-84 recession—and that there will be almost
no change in prices. My forecast for Kentucky is that the
State’s economy will grow by approximately 0.5 percent
in 2009 but that the unemployment rate in Kentucky will
average 8.2 percent for the year and will be slightly above
the unemployment rate for the nation.
Dr. Brandon Koford, an Assistant Professor of
Economics at Valdosta State University, examines citizens’
preferences for public spending categories in Kentucky’s
budget using a survey of Kentucky residents in 2007.
The top budget priority for Kentuckians is education;
health care is also a high priority. The ranking of citizens’
priorities closely matches the ranking of actual spending,
although citizens are more equitable in their proposed

distribution of funding than the
state.
The fourth article is by Dr.
Alison Davis, an Assistant Professor
of Agricultural Economics. This
article looks at differences in incomes
between rural and urban portions of
Kentucky. Dr. Davis documents
differences in demographics,
agriculture, education, quality-of-life indicators, and
economic indicators. Her findings suggest that the lower
level of income in Kentucky’s rural counties is related to
low levels of education, labor-force participation, and
health insurance coverage.
The fifth article in the report is by Dr. John Garen, the
chair of the Department of Economics, Christopher Jepsen,
an Assistant Professor of Economics and the Associate
Director of CBER, and Dr. Frank Scott, a Gatton Professor
of Economics. In this article Drs. Garen, Jepsen, and Scott
examine the aluminum industry in Kentucky. They look
at recent trends in employment, salaries, productivity, and
safety. The authors find that employment and earnings
have remained steady or declined, whereas productivity
has increased. Safety statistics have shown no clear
pattern.
The final article in the report is written by Anna
Stewart, an economic analyst at CBER. In this article Ms.
Stewart reports on the results of the annual survey of
business confidence that CBER conducts for the Kentucky
Association of Manufacturers. This survey asks businesses
about their performance over the past year and their
expectation about the coming year. The survey results
suggest that business owners are becoming increasingly
pessimistic about the growth in manufacturing in
Kentucky in the coming year.
In the past year, we have worked on a number of
important projects at the Center for Business and Economic
Research. One project we recently completed examined
recent changes in the revenue sources used to finance
K-12 education and the impact these changes have on
the allocation of expenditures. A companion report,
set to come out in January 2009, will examine whether
changes in revenue sources has any impact of educational
outcomes. In another report we examined the model used
in Kentucky to obtain child support orders and whether
the existing model needs to be modified or updated.
Finally, we also recently completed a report examining
the impact that increasing tuition has on enrollments in
community and technical colleges. In the coming year we
anticipate completing several new project we believe will
address some of the important problems facing Kentucky.
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Anatomy of the Financial Crisis
of 2008
Donald J. Mullineaux
This article discusses the factors that underpinned and facilitated the financial crisis that
continues to plague the global economy. We suggest that each of the causal elements can
be viewed as examples of “innovation gone awry.” We explain how what appeared to be
a relatively small, fairly localized problem relative to the huge scale of financial markets
became a much larger problem with severely adverse implications for the global macro
economy. We also consider how institutional mistakes and failures contributed to the crisis.

Introduction
The year 2008 will go down in the annals of
economic history as the year of the worst financial
crisis to hit the United States (and the rest of the
globe) since the Great Depression. The crisis has
taken a major toll on the financial system, reflected
in the demise of large investment banks such as
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, the fall of large
commercial banks such as Washington Mutual and
Indy Mac, and the general loss of credit available
from traditional providers. The overall economy has
not been spared, and the recession now underway
is expected to last through the better part of 2009,
which would make it the longest downturn since
the 1930s. Not surprisingly, many have asked,
Why and how did this happen? Who or what is
to blame? The media, with its penchant for pithy
explanations for complicated issues, has pointed to
“deregulation” and “greedy executives” at financial
institutions as the main causes and primary culprits
behind the financial meltdown. In this article, we
suggest that deregulation played very little role in
fomenting the crisis. The main cause, in one word,
was innovation. Usually we think of innovation as
a good thing, and it is, for the most part. But, as is
the case with, say, wine and chocolate, there can be
too much of a good thing. No doubt at least partly
motivated by greed, financial executives pushed
the financial innovation envelope beyond the
boundaries of rationality. But they were aided and
abetted in their efforts by other players, including
politicians, the Federal Reserve, the governmentsponsored enterprises (GSEs, such as Fannie Mae
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and Freddie Mac), some borrowers, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the rating
agencies. Our goal is to provide an anatomy of the
crisis, including a brief overview of its implications
and some discussion of the policy responses to
what has unfolded. The problems and issues are
very much in play, and things could readily change
from the date of this writing (December 10, 2008).
Three innovations that played some role in
underpinning the crisis include a novel strategy
in banking called the originate to distribute model, a
different form of raising funds called securitization,
and new entry into a previously untapped area of
the mortgage market called the subprime segment.
Although the first two innovations are not recent
developments, the evolution of and rapid growth in
subprime lending is quite recent. The combination of
these business methods and strategies was extremely
profitable for financial institutions throughout the
better part of the current decade. But when housing
prices peaked in late 2006 and started to decline
fairly rapidly in at least some markets, the inherent
flaw in the package of strategies became increasingly
apparent. Large profits turned quickly into
whopping losses at those institutions with sizeable
exposures to the subprime segment. But let’s step
back and look at the scenario in a bit more detail.

The Originate to Distribute Model
As professors of banking have told students
for many years, commercial banks act as financial
intermediaries. The defining characteristics of this
business are deposit taking and lending. But for the
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better part of banking history, when institutions
made new loans, they held them on their balance
sheets until they matured. Because banks were
quite careful in assessing the creditworthiness of
borrowers, loans were repaid roughly 98 to 99 percent
of the time, on average. Despite the widespread
success of this strategy, some bank managers,
especially those at larger institutions, recognized
that the capacity to grow loans was limited by the
rate at which new deposits were arriving. Why not
try to sell some of the loans already made to other
financial institutions or investors in the capital
markets and use the cash from the sales to fund new
loans? This cycle of generating loans for the purpose
of sale and then generating still more loans became
known as the originate to distribute model. Banks
were, in effect, getting paid fees to assess who was
creditworthy and who was not, but not for taking the
risk that the loan would default.1 Buyers of the loans
assumed the credit risk and received the interest on
the loans as compensation. Although this situation
implies that originators might pay less attention
to the quality of the loans they originate if they no
longer bear the risk, the prospect that a borrower
might default would still need to be low enough
for a loan buyer to find the loan attractive. But if
loan buyers were less careful in assessing risks than
originators, the originate to distribute strategy could
result in higher defaults than the old-fashioned
strategy of originating and holding the loans.

Securitization as a Funding Strategy
Securitization is a funding strategy that involves
creating a bond that is collateralized by a pool of loans.
Although practically any loan can be securitized,
mortgages represent by far the most popular type
of securitization. In 2000–2006, about 75 percent of
all mortgage loans were securitized, creating assets
known as mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac are major players in the
securitization market, both as buyers of mortgages
to form the pools of collateral, as guarantors on the
securities, and as owners of MBS. The availability
of the securitization option facilitates the use of the
originate to distribute strategy, of course. The buyers
1 Banks that sold loans might also make some profit on the sale
itself. Banks were also motivated to sell by regulations that required that loans be backed with relatively expensive capital. If
the loan seller did not grant any recourse to the buyer, the loan
was removed from the balance sheet and the capital requirement
was avoided.
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of MBS, such as banks, insurance companies, mutual
funds, pension funds, and wealthy individuals, find
them attractive because they have higher returns
than Treasury securities of like maturity, are highly
liquid, and have been viewed as having relatively
little default risk, either because of the perceived
benefits of diversification in the pool of mortgages
that form the collateral or because of guarantees,
or both.2 Commercial and investment banks also
like securitization because they can earn large fees
for underwriting the MBS and other asset-backed
bonds. By 2007, about 10 large commercial banks
were receiving more fee income from securitization
activities than all 8,500 banks collectively received
from traditional deposit and lending activities.
The amount of securitized bonds in the United
States exceeded $10 trillion by mid-2008. The
volume of activity grew so rapidly during the last
3–4 years that many investment banks bought
companies that specialized in originating mortgages
to have ready access to the raw material (the
underlying mortgages) that underpin securitization.

The Birth and Rapid Growth of
Subprime Lending
Prime mortgages go to borrowers with good
credit histories who make sizeable down payments
and document their incomes. Subprime borrowers
lack one or more of these characteristics. Subprime
lending represents an innovation designed to help
achieve a long-standing, politically supported social
goal: an increase in homeownership, especially
among low-income and minority households.
From essentially zero in 1993, subprime mortgage
lending grew at a compound annual growth rate
of 26 percent to $625 billion by 2005, comprising
close to one fourth of the total mortgage market at
its peak.3 Subprime lending was itself facilitated by
another innovation, the application of credit-scoring
techniques to mortgage originations, which allowed
underwriting to become automated. Subprime
2 The Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie
Mae) insures against default on MBS in return for a fee, as do
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
3 If another category of mortgages, Alt-A loans, is included with
subprime, the ratio rises above 30 percent in 2005–07. Alt-A
borrowers have higher FICO scores than subprime customers,
but remain non-prime because of a lack of documentation
about income or assets, or a high loan-to-value ratio, or a high
payment-to-income ratio.
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Anatomy of the Financial Crisis of 2008
borrowers typically have FICO scores below 640.4
Some firms, such as New Century Financial and
First Franklin, specialized in subprime lending, but
the majority of originations were by independent
mortgage brokers, who have always followed the
originate to distribute strategy. Some 12 million new
homeowners were created over the last 8–10 years,
and home ownership rose from 64 to 69 percent.
To provide the funds necessary to support
the rapid growth of subprime lending, originators
turned to securitization. Brokerage firms, banks,
and even homebuilders issued so-called “privatelabel” MBS that often lacked the guarantees
associated with the securities issued by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. In yet another innovation,
the MBS themselves became collateral for other
securities called collateralized debt obligations.
Over the period 2000–2007, the volume of subprime
mortgage-backed securities grew by 800 percent.
One key difference between prime and subprime
mortgages is that the latter are usually structured
as hybrids in which the interest rate is fixed for the
first two or three years, then resets to a variable,
and typically much higher, rate. This so-called 2/28
or 3/27 loan structure creates a strong incentive
for borrowers to refinance at or near the rate reset
period. About 80 percent of subprime mortgages
also have prepayment fees (versus only about 2
percent of prime mortgages), making refinancing
more profitable in this case. The end result of
this approach to structuring subprime loans is
that the payoff profile becomes highly dependent
on housing prices. As long as housing prices are
increasing sufficiently, lenders and borrowers win
from refinancing. But if housing prices decline,
refinancing is no longer rational, and borrowers
face a high prospect of defaulting following
the rate reset. Housing prices began to decline
nationally in the summer of 2006, and it quickly
became clear that plenty of losing bets outstanding
were embedded in both the mortgages and the
securities that they appeared to be securing. The
S&P/Case Shiller Index of house prices in 20 large
U.S. markets nationally has dropped in every
subsequent quarter since the peak and is down
almost 21 percent through the third quarter of 2008.5
4 FICO scores were developed by Fair Isaac and Company as
an inexpensive means of predicting loan default. FICO scores
range from 350 to 800. The lower the score, the higher the
prospect of default.
5 In contrast, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise estimates
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Why Did a Small Problem Become a
Large Problem?
Although the subprime market grew rapidly,
it remained only a very small portion of the U.S.
credit markets, which were roughly $24.4 trillion at
year-end 2007. Yet credit became widely unavailable
during the financial crisis, and various segments
of the market were widely described in the press
as “frozen,” “shut down,” or “non-functional.”
How did a problem in a small segment of the
market get transmitted to the wider credit market?
The first signs of the crisis became visible in two
little-known, but sizeable segments of the market:
the repurchase agreement (RP) market and the
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market.
Repurchase agreements are secured loans,
primarily extended by one financial institution to
another. The key element of an RP is that if the
borrower defaults, the lender seizes the collateral
and sells it to recoup the value of the loan. Various
types of collateral exist, only a small portion of
which are subprime-backed securities. Nonetheless,
this huge market (estimated to be about $7 trillion)
almost completely dried up in August 2007 and
remained dormant for several months. Traders were
unwilling to accept most types of collateral because
they were unsure they would be able to sell at any
price close to the loan value in the event of default.
Without the funding supplied by RPs, the issuers
were forced to cut back dramatically on their lending.
Commercial paper is short-term debt (less than
90 days) that is often unsecured, but it can also be
backed by financial assets, including subprime loans
or loans to institutions with exposures in the subprime
market. Issues of ABCP had increased from about
$600 billion in 2005 to $1.2 trillion by the fall of 2007.
Recognizing the emerging problems in the subprime
market, when such debt matured during the fourth
quarter of 2007 lenders simply refused to provide
new financing, and the volume of ABCP dropped
sharply in just a few months to roughly $800 billion.
Much of the decline in willingness to lend
reflected a high degree of uncertainty about the value
of assets in general, but especially about so-called
structured assets, only part of which were subprimerelated.6 As 2008 unfolded, it became increasingly
that U.S. homeowners enjoyed an increase in their house prices
of over 54 percent, on average, from 2001 to 2005.
6 A structured asset is one with a cash flow that is derived from
some other asset or is contingent on some specified event.
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clear that sizeable losses would be incurred by large
institutions that were heavily invested in subprimerelated assets. Under accounting regulations, these
assets are required to be marked to market on the
balance sheets of the institutions holding them.
Losses on these assets, which totaled as much as
30–50 percent of their value, must be subtracted
from the equity on the companies’ balance sheets.
Many of the large investment banks active in
the subprime area were very highly leveraged,
which means they had relatively little equity to
support losses. For example, Bear Stearns, which
was acquired by JP Morgan Chase in March
2008—preventing an imminent bankruptcy, used
only about $3 dollars of equity to fund every $100 of
assets. In other words, Bear Stearns was borrowing
money, much of it for fairly short periods, to invest
in assets that represented large bets on housing
prices. As the lenders saw the prospective losses
accumulating, they refused to roll over their loans,
and Bear Stearns was no longer viable. A similar
fate awaited Lehman Brothers, which was even
more highly leveraged and declared bankruptcy
on September 15, 2008. Because virtually no trading
was being done in the distressed subprime assets,
these instruments became increasingly difficult to
value. Consequently, no one had a strong sense of
the magnitude of the losses financial institutions
were facing. Banks were increasingly unwilling to
lend, not just to households and businesses, but
even to each other. Faced with a drastic decline in
liquidity and recognizing they were over-leveraged,
many institutions began to sell assets. But this
simply drove asset prices down even further, and
institutions were caught in a debt-deflation cycle.
To address the lack of liquidity and to attempt
to restore some confidence that financial failures
would be limited, the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve created a series of programs (referred to
more colloquially as “bailouts”) to inject funds
into the credit markets in the form of loans and
investments. The Federal Reserve, which formerly
lent only to depository institutions, is now lending to
investment banks, insurance companies, issuers of
commercial paper, and managers of money market
mutual funds.7 The Fed is no longer a banker’s bank,

but is instead acting like a regular bank. And like
a regular bank, it may suffer losses on some of its
loans. If that happens, the taxpayers will bear those
losses. The most publicized of these programs, the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), makes up
to $700 billion available to financial institutions
in the form of preferred stock investments.
The total funds that have been made available
to date through all these governmental efforts have
been estimated to be $3–4 trillion. More may come.
These funds have been either borrowed by the
Treasury or involve monies created by the Federal
Reserve through its monetary policy authority. These
amounts do not measure the taxpayers’ financial
exposure to the bailouts, however, because some
(small? large?) chance exists that all the loans will
be repaid and the preferred stock redeemed. If this
were to happen, the taxpayers would actually profit
because the interest on the loans and the dividends
on the stock are higher than the Treasury’s cost of
borrowing. But reasonable prospects are that at
least some of the funds will not be repaid. Because
we cannot readily predict defaults by the recipients
of government funds, the taxpayers’ exposure is
unknown and is likely to be uncertain for some time.
The economy is mired in what appears to be a
lengthy recession, so more bailouts may be on the
horizon, and some losses to taxpayers seem almost
inevitable. It appears very likely that substantial
government funds will soon be made available to
forestall what will otherwise be a substantial number
of foreclosures. Although the size and substance
of such a program is unknown, it may prove the
riskiest to the taxpayers. In the limited experience
we have in the area of loan modifications to forestall
foreclosures, a relatively high percentage of modified
loans are back in default within less than a year.
Taxpayers face still another risk. The Federal
Reserve’s balance sheet has ballooned from about
$800 billion to roughly $2.5 trillion as of year-end
2008. Some of the increase in Federal Reserve
assets is funded by borrowings from the Treasury,
but a sizeable portion reflects the creation of bank
reserves, which is contributing to a rapid expansion
of the U.S. money supply. This increase in the money
supply is designed to be temporary, and the Fed’s

Structured assets contain embedded options.
7 As a result of the financial crisis, no large, free-standing
investment banks are remaining in the United States. Lehman
Brothers went bankrupt, Bear Stearns was acquired by JP
Morgan Chase, Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of America,

and Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs have become bank
holding companies. Affiliating with a financial holding company
or becoming a bank holding company improves access to
financial support from the Federal Reserve, but also permits
the Fed to be more involved in regulating these companies.
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objective will be to shrink its balance sheet (and
consequently the money supply) as the financial
crisis ebbs. If the Fed fails to accomplish this, the
U.S. economy will transition to a permanently
higher rate of inflation. Since inflation erodes the
real value of assets, the outcome would ironically
be similar to the one that current policies are trying
to prevent: further declines in asset values and
the attendant wealth losses. The Federal Reserve
has announced that it is considering borrowing
money in the capital markets to avoid using money
creation to fund its rescue operations. This would
be yet another unprecedented action on their part.

Could We Have Avoided This Mess?
We have identified a chain of events, each
encouraged to some extent by financial innovation,
which culminated in the financial crisis of 2008.
But did all this have to happen this way? Who
might have prevented, or at least mitigated, the
crisis? Who aided and abetted the crisis? Politicians
certainly played some role by treating housing
as a sector of the economy that deserved strong
governmental support and in providing an implicit
guarantee on the debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac.8 These two government-sponsored enterprises
held or guaranteed over $5 trillion dollars worth of
outstanding mortgages at the time of their demise.
The Federal Reserve also laid some of the foundation
for the crisis by keeping interest rates very low
(below the rate of inflation) from 2002 through
much of 2005, facilitating the increased demand
for housing. Also culpable were borrowers who
assumed mortgage obligations much beyond their

abilities to repay and institutions that were willing
to extend those credits. The Securities and Exchange
Commission might have made some efforts to
restrain the very rapid growth in the use of financial
leverage by investment banks. The rating agencies
failed to adequately inform investors of the risk
inherent in the menu of new structured products,
especially those backed by subprime loans. Finally,
the boards of directors of the companies that
contributed to the financial crisis failed to adequately
perform their governance roles in restraining
excessive risk taking. In other words, plenty of
blame for the financial crisis can be spread around.
The crisis has taught us many costly lessons.
No doubt significant efforts will be made to
address some of these failings through new
regulations, including some likely restructuring
of our regulatory architecture (that is, who will be
responsible for regulating what). Efforts to enhance
the coordination of regulation globally are also
quite likely. It is too early to speculate what these
efforts might entail, but given the large scale of the
crisis, the governmental response will almost surely
likewise be large. A definite risk exists of regulatory
overkill and multiple applications of the law of
unintended consequences. The crisis is far from
over, and the needed corrections in the financial
system will be complicated by the weak state of the
U.S and global economies. Yet the credit markets
must begin again to perform their vital functions for
the recovery to get underway. The economy and the
financial system are definitely sailing in uncharted
waters, and we remain some distance from the
shores of financial health and economic well being.

8 The implicit debt guarantee became quite explicit when both
Fannie and Freddie were placed in conservatorship in September. In addition to the guarantees, Fannie and Freddie were
provided with $200 billion in government funds in the form
of preferred stock investment.

Kentucky Annual Economic Report 2009

5

The Year the Wheels Fell Off the Economy:
A Review of Economic Performance in 2008 and
Forecasts for 2009

Kenneth R.Troske
The year 2008 will certainly be remembered as one of the most turbulent years in recent
memory with the continuing deterioration of the housing market, the sudden collapse of the
financial sector, and the subsequent decline in prices and output. In addition, the federal
government’s response to these problems has produced one of the largest expansions of
government into the private sector since the Great Depression. In this article I review the main
trends we have seen in the U.S. and Kentucky economies in the past several years, discuss the
trends we have seen in the parts of the economy that I expect to have a significant impact in the
coming year—the housing, financial and manufacturing sectors, personal consumption and
fuel prices—and discuss my predictions for 2009. My forecast for the U.S. is that the economy
will contract by 0.5 percent for all of 2009, that unemployment will average 8 percent for the
year—which would be the highest rate since the 1982-84 recession—and that there will be
almost no change in prices. My forecast for Kentucky is that the State’s economy will grow by
approximately 0.5 percent in 2009 but that the unemployment rate in Kentucky will average
8.2 percent for the year and will be slightly above the unemployment rate for the nation.
I.

Introduction

Wow. 2008 will certainly be remembered as one
of the most turbulent years in recent memory. While
the economy experienced slow, but fairly persistent,
growth through the first half of the year, there
were signs of impending trouble—the continuing
deterioration of the housing market and rapidly
rising prices for food and energy. However, almost
no one predicted what happened to the economy in
the last three months. Confidence in the financial
sector of the economy seemed to evaporate almost
overnight leading to a significant drop in the stock
market and the freezing up of credit markets. This
in turn lead to a precipitous decline in consumer
spending, which has spread the troubles in the
financial and housing sectors to the rest of the
economy. The result has been a decline in output, a
significant increase in the unemployment rate, and
falling prices. In an attempt to reverse the decline
in the economy, the federal government along with
the Federal Reserve System instituted the largest
expansion of the government sector since the Great
Depression: nationalizing banks and insurance
companies, purchasing an extensive amount of
commercial paper, and even taking an ownership
stake in private auto makers. Unfortunately, similar
to what we saw in the Great Depression, there is no
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evidence that any of these actions has had an impact
on the economy—at least not yet. Given all of these
changes, the economy we have in January 2009 is
certainly a much different economy than the one we
faced in January 2008.
While Kentucky certainly has not escaped the
turbulence that has rocked the national economy, if
there is a silver lining, it might be that the Kentucky
economy appears to be experiencing a much
smaller slowdown than states such as California,
New York and Florida. While unemployment has
risen in Kentucky, and the troubles in the auto
industry have had a significant effect on the State’s
economy, Kentucky appears to have experienced
much less turbulence in the housing sector, so
consumers in Kentucky seem to be more confident
than consumers elsewhere. Of course any optimism
about the Kentucky economy must be tempered
by the recognition that Kentucky remains one of
the poorest states in the country and our relatively
better performance during the current recession is
unlikely to change this fact.
So what should we expect from the economy in
the coming year? Well, it appears that the problems
in the housing sector—declining prices, slowing
housing starts and high rates of foreclosure—will
persist throughout 2009 and into 2010. This in
turn will limit the growth in both the U.S. and
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Percent

Kentucky economies.
Figure 1: Percentage Change in U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
However, I do expect that
8.0
both economies will start
7.0
growing again, although
6.0
not until the latter half of
2009. So while I believe
5.0
we will continue to see
4.0
slow or negative growth
3.0
and relatively high rates
2.0
of unemployment in 2009,
1.0
I remain confident that
0.0
when I write this forecast
-1.0
next year I will be writing
about the beginning of
Quarter
a recovery instead of
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
the continuation of a
quarter by -0.5 percent. Forecasts for the fourth
recession.
quarter are for an even larger contraction, with
In the rest of this article I will review the main
some economists forecasting a contraction of the
trends we have seen in the U.S. and Kentucky
U.S. economy of 4 to 6 percent, which would be the
economies in the past several years. I will also
largest quarterly decline in the economy since 1982.
examine some of the trends we have seen in the parts
Clearly the U.S. economy is struggling.
of the economy that I expect to have a significant
The data presented in Figure 2 shows the annual
impact in the coming year—the housing, financial
growth in GDP for both the U.S. and Kentucky.
and manufacturing sectors, personal consumption
This figure makes clear that in the last several
and fuel prices. Finally, I will discuss in more detail
years the U.S. economy has grown faster than the
my predictions for 2009.
Kentucky economy, but that the U.S. economy
may now be growing at a slightly slower rate than
II.
Overview of the U.S. and
the Kentucky economy. In 2007 the Kentucky
Kentucky Economies
economy outperformed the U.S. economy and all
indications are that this will continue to be true in
A. The Slowing Economy
2008. Figure 3, which presents the annual growth
According to the business cycle dating committee
in GDP for the largest metropolitan statistical
of the National Bureau of Economic Research,
areas (MSA) in Kentucky, shows that there have
the U.S. entered a recession in December of 2007.
Figure 1, which plots
Figure 2: Percentage Change in GDP in the U.S. and Kentucky
the percentage change
4.0
in the Gross Domestic
3.5
Product (GDP) by quarter
3.0
for the U.S., shows that
the economy did indeed
2.5
experience a contraction
2.0
in the fourth quarter of
1.5
2007, of approximately
1.0
-0.2 percent. However,
0.5
the U.S. economy
expanded in both the
0.0
first and second quarters
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Year
of 2008, albeit by less than
U.S.
Kentucky
2 percent, before again
contracting in the third Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Figure 3: Percentage Change in GDP in Kentucky’s Major
Metropolitian Statistical Areas (MSAs)
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-1.0
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis

Figure 4: Unemployment Rate for the U.S. and Kentucky
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

Figure 5: Employment Growth in the U.S. and Kentucky
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Kentucky

been some significant differences
in economic performance across
different areas in Kentucky. Since
2004 the Lexington-Fayette MSA
has been the fastest growing of
the three areas, followed by the
Louisville-Jefferson MSA, with
the Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky
MSA experiencing the slowest
growth.
B. The Deterioration of the Labor
Market
		
Further evidence that the
U.S. economy entered a recession
in the fourth quarter of 2007 is
provided by Figure 4, which
shows the unemployment rates
for the U.S. and Kentucky. Between
January 2004 and January 2007 the
unemployment rate in Kentucky
was higher than the unemployment
rate for the entire U.S. Since then,
however, the unemployment rates
in Kentucky and the U.S. have been
similar. Throughout 2008 the U.S.
and Kentucky unemployment
rates have been rising fairly
consistently. In December 2008 the
unemployment rate in the U.S. was
7.2 percent, which is a 44 percent
increase over the rate twelve
months earlier. In Kentucky in
December 2008 the unemployment
rate stood at 7.0 percent, which
is 32 percent higher than a year
earlier.
Further evidence of the
deteriorating labor market is
provided in Figure 5, which shows
the growth in employment in the
U.S and Kentucky. In this figure
employment in a period is measured
relative to employment in January
2003. In other words, I have
divided the actual employment
in a month by the employment in
January 2003, and then multiplied
this ratio by 100. If the resulting
number is bigger than 100, this
means that employment in a given
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significantly in recent
months (the core CPI
excludes food and energy
8.0
prices). As I will show in
7.0
the next section, much of
6.0
the decline in the overall
5.0
CPI is the result of a
4.0
decline in energy prices.
3.0
However, the fact that the
2.0
core CPI has also fallen
shows that the prices of
1.0
other goods and services
0.0
have fallen as well. It is
Jan-04
Jan-05
Jan-06
Jan-07
Jan-08
Year
these falling prices that
Lexington-Fayette
Louisville-Jefferson
Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky
lead some economists to
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
predict that consumer
month is higher than employment in January 2003;
spending will rebound,
and if the number is less than 100 then employment
which would indicate the beginning of a recovery.
is lower. The actual value shows the percentage
change in employment since January 2003. This
III. A Closer Look at the Economy
figure shows that employment in the U.S. has been
In this section I will to take a closer look at some
declining since December 2007, while employment
of the parts of the economy that have contributed
in Kentucky has been declining since March 2008.
to the current downturn, and are expected to
This figure also shows that between January 2004
determine when the recovery begins. These parts
and December 2007 growth in employment in the
of the economy include the housing, manufacturing
U.S. exceeded employment growth in Kentucky,
and financial sectors, personal consumption
but since then the fall in employment in the U.S.
expenditures and energy prices. I will start by
has been greater than the fall in employment in
looking at the financial sector.
Kentucky.
A. A Loss of Confidence in the Financial Sector
Figures 6 shows that there are some obvious
Clearly the recent loss of confidence in the financial
differences in labor markets across metropolitan
sector has contributed to the size of the economic
areas in Kentucky. While all three metropolitan
downturn. The extent of this loss in confidence can be
areas have seen increases in unemployment rates
seen in Figure 8, which plots the Dow Jones Industrial
over the past year, the Lexington-Fayette MSA
Average since January 2004. This figure shows
continues to enjoy unemployment rates that
are much lower than the
Figure 7: Monthly Change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
rates for the state as a
6.0
whole and lower than the
5.0
rates for the Louisville
and Cincinnati-Northern
4.0
Kentucky MSAs
C. A Bright Spot: Prices
3.0
The recent fall
2.0
in prices is one of the
few bright spots in the
1.0
economy. As is shown in
0.0
Figure 7, both the overall
Jan-04
Jan-05
Jan-06
Jan-07
Jan-08
Consumer Price Index
Year
(CPI) as well as the core
CPI
Core CPI
CPI have declined fairly
Percent

Percent

Figure 6: Unemployment Rate for Kentucky’s Major MSAs

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
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end of 2006. However,
in 2008 the problems
that have plagued the
16,000
housing sector have
14,000
finally spread to the
rest of the economy.
12,000
We start by looking
10,000
at Figure 9 which
8,000
shows the percent of
6,000
all mortgages that are
in foreclosure for both
4,000
the U.S. and Kentucky.
2,000
Looking first at the line
0
for the U.S. we can see
that the foreclosure rate
has been rising since
the beginning of 2006,
Date
but accelerated quite
Source: Dow Jones Indexes
dramatically starting
that the Dow rose fairly steadily between January
in
early
2007.
It
appears
as
if the growth in the
2004 and October 2007, when it reached its peak at
foreclosure rate may have slowed in the last few
around 14,100 points. Then between October 2007
quarters, although we will need more quarters of
and September 2008 the Dow experienced a fairly
data before we can say with any confidence that the
steady decline in value to around 11,500 points.
growth in foreclosures has slowed or stopped.
However, between the beginning of September and
Comparing the foreclosure rate for Kentucky
the beginning of December the Dow plummeted—
with the rate for the entire country shows that the
dropping nearly 3000 points or 26 percent of its
foreclosure rate in Kentucky has been higher than
value. This loss of confidence quickly spread to
the rate for the entire U.S. for most of the period in
other sectors of the economy.
this chart. However, while the foreclosure rate in
B. The Continuing Slide in the Housing Market
Kentucky has risen in recent years, the increase in
With the rising foreclosure rates, falling
Kentucky has been smaller than the increase in the
prices and the slowdown in new construction the
rest of the country, and there has been relatively
housing sector has received close scrutiny since the
little change in the
Figure 9: Foreclosures as a Percentage of All Mortgages
foreclosure rate in
3.5
Kentucky in the first
three quarters of
3.0
2008. In fact, the
foreclosure rate
2.5
in the U.S. is now
2.0
almost 20 percent
higher than the
1.5
foreclosure rate in
1.0
Kentucky.
As has been
0.5
extensively
0.0
discussed, one
of the primary
2004-I
2005-I
2006-I
2007-I
2008-I
Year
reasons for the
rising foreclosure
U.S.
Kentucky
rate has been falling
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Figure 8: Weekly Average of the Dow Jones Industrial Average

Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
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areas is consistent with
the lower foreclosure rate
in the state.
450.0
One obvious
400.0
question to ask is: “When
350.0
will it all end?” That
300.0
is, when will housing
250.0
prices stop falling and
200.0
start rising again? I
150.0
100.0
address this question in
50.0
Figure 12 which shows
0.0
the number of new houses
2004-I
2005-I
2006-I
2007-I
2008-I
built and the number of
Year
new households formed
U.S.
Kentucky
each year since 1990 in
Source: U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
the U.S. Over the long run
housing prices. In Figure 10 I plot the Office of
the number of new houses
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, or OFHEO,
built will equal the number of new households
housing price index for both the U.S. and Kentucky.
formed. While the line showing the number of new
Looking at the line for the U.S. shows that housing
households jumps around a bit, it does tend to track
prices reached a peak in the second quarter of 2007
the number of new houses built fairly closely until
and have been falling since then. In contrast, the
2003. Then there are several years when the number
price index for Kentucky shows that housing prices
of new houses built exceeds the number of new
in this state, while they have fallen somewhat, have
households formed. Essentially, this means that
not declined as much as they have in other parts of
builders were building more houses than there were
the country.
people to buy those houses. When there is more
Further evidence of the relative stability of
of a good then there are people to buy the good,
housing prices in Kentucky is found in Figure 11
prices will fall. Since houses are a durable asset it
which presents the OFHEO housing price index for
will take several years where the number of new
the Lexington, Louisville and Cincinnati-Northern
households formed exceeds the number of houses
Kentucky MSAs. This figure again shows that,
built before this market will stabilize and prices will
while prices have fallen in both Louisville and
begin to rise again. As can be seen in the figure, the
Northern Kentucky, the declines have been small.
number of new households exceeded the number of
This relatively small decline in housing prices in all
new houses in 2007, and preliminary data suggests
of Kentucky and in Kentucky’s main metropolitan
the same thing will be true in 2008. However,
given the number of new
Figure 11: OFHEO Housing Price Index for Kentucky’s Major MSAs
houses being built each
200.0
year, it is likely that we
180.0
will continue to have an
160.0
“excess” stock of housing
140.0
and falling housing
120.0
prices until 2010. This
100.0
downward pressure on
80.0
housing prices will limit
60.0
the size of any economic
40.0
20.0
recovery until then.
0.0
This analysis
2004-I
2005-I
2006-I
2007-I
2008-I
should also make clear
Year
the problem with efforts
Lexington-Fayette
Louisville-Jefferson
Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky
designed to prop up
Index

Index

Figure 10: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)
Housing Price Index for the U.S. and Kentucky

Source: U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
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housing prices or
Figure 12: Number of New Houses and New Households in the U.S.
to try and subsidize
mortgages rates. Any 2,500
effort to artificially
i n c r e a s e h o u s i n g 2,000
prices will just
1,500
encourage builders
to build more houses, 1,000
which will exacerbate
the existing excess
500
supply and postpone
0
any recovery.
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Unfortunately, the
Year
only way out of the
Housing Starts
New Households
current housing
crisis is to wait until Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
consumption expenditure actually declined by
we have enough new
3.8 percent, which is the first decline in consumer
households willing to buy the houses that have
expenditure since 1991. This decline in expenditures
already been built.
transferred the problems in the financial and
C. Personal Consumption: Spreading Problems to the
housing sectors of the economy to other parts of
Rest of the Economy
the economy, such as the auto industry and retail
Much of the growth in the economy in the last
trade.
several years was fueled by the continual growth
D. The Manufacturing Sector: An Important
in consumer expenditures. However, as the old
Determinant of the Kentucky Economy
adage states, what goes around comes around, so
While the manufacturing sector has declined
it should not be surprising that much of the recent
in importance in recent years, it still remains a
downturn has also been fueled by a significant
significant industry in terms of both output and
decline in consumer spending. For most people
employment, particularly in Kentucky. The
their investments in both the stock market and
manufacturing sector accounts for over less than
the housing market represent their main source
10 percent of employment in the entire U.S. but
of wealth: so it was only a matter of time before
accounts for 13 percent of employment and almost
declines in these sectors would have an impact on
consumer spending.
Figure 13: Growth in Personal Consumption Expenditure in the U.S.
This is what is
illustrated in Figure
13, which shows the
5.0
growth in personal
4.0
consumption
3.0
expenditure by
2.0
quarter in the U.S. As
is seen in this figure,
1.0
the growth in personal
0.0
consumption began
-1.0
to slow in the second
-2.0
quarter of 2007 and
-3.0
remained anemic
-4.0
through the first half
-5.0
of 2008. However,
Quarter
in the third quarter
o f 2 0 0 8 p e r s o n a l Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Figure 14: Growth in Manufacturing Employment in the U.S. and Kentucky
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

Figure 15: Spot Price of a Barrel of Oil
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Figure 16: Average Price of a Gallon of Gasoline in the U.S. and Kentucky
$5.00
$4.50
$4.00
Dollars per Gallon

$3.50
$3.00
$2.50
$2.00
$1.50
$1.00
$0.50
$0.00
Jan-05

Jan-06

Jan-07
Year
U.S.

Jan-08
Kentucky

Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration and Department for Energy Development
and Independence, Kentucky Energy Watch

14

20 percent of earnings
in Kentucky. Therefore,
the performance of
this one sector is an
important determinant
of the performance of the
economy—particularly
in Kentucky. To assess
the performance of the
manufacturing sector,
Figure 14 plots growth
in manufacturing
employment for the U.S.
and Kentucky. This
figure is constructed
in a similar manner as
Figure 5—employment in
each period is measured
relative to employment in
January 2003. Numbers
greater than 100 indicate
that employment has
grown since January
2003, while number less
than 100 indicates that
employment in the sector
has fallen since January
2003.
Figure 14 shows
that manufacturing
employment has declined
since 2003 for both the
U.S. as a whole and in
Kentucky. For the entire
country manufacturing
employment fell fairly
rapidly between January
2003 and January 2004,
was stable through
the middle of 2006,
but began to fall fairly
quickly over the last two
years. In contrast, in
Kentucky manufacturing
employment remained
steady through the
middle of 2006, but since
then has been declining
at a much faster rate than
for the U.S. as a whole.
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Table 1: Forecast for 2009
2008 Forecast

Actual Performance
2008

2009 Forecast

Real GDP Growth--U.S.

2.3%

1.2%

0.5%

Unemployment Rate--U.S.

4.7%

5.7%

8.0%

Inflation--U.S.

2.7%

2.5%

0.6%

Employment Growth--U.S.

-1.4%

-1.0%

Employment Growth--Kentucky

-1.2%

-0.5%

Growth in Manufacturing
Employment--U.S.

-4.3%

-4.5%

Growth in Manufacturing
Employment--Kentucky

-4.5%

-4.0%

Real GDP Growth--Kentucky

2.4%

---

1.0%

Unemployment Rate--Kentucky

5.7%

6.3%

8.5%

This decline in manufacturing was particularly
large in the second half of 2008 when manufacturing
employment fell by 5 percent. By the end of 2008
manufacturing employment in both the U.S. and
Kentucky was over 10 percent lower than it was in
January 2003. Given the greater importance of the
manufacturing sector in the Kentucky economy,
this recent drop in manufacturing employment in
Kentucky is an area of concern.
E. Some Hope for the Future: Falling Energy Prices
After being a source of significant concerns for the
last several years, in the last six months changes in
all prices in general, and energy prices in particular,
represent one of the few bright spots in the current
economy. Figure 15 shows the price of a barrel of
oil since 2003. As this figure shows, after rising for
five and a half years, the price of a barrel of oil has
fallen by 70 percent in the last six months and has
returned to a level last seen in mid 2004. Figure 16
shows that this fall in the price of oil produced
a similar decline in the price of gasoline in both
the U.S. and Kentucky. The hope is that falling
fuel prices will lead to an increase in consumer
confidence, which would in turn lead to growth
in consumption expenditures and to growth in the
overall economy.
IV. Outlook for 2009
So what will 2009 bring? In Table 1 I present my
forecast for the coming year. In column 1 I present
my forecast for 2008, in column 2 I show the actual
performance in 2008, and in column 3 I present my
prediction for 2009.
While I do believe that the economy will begin
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to grow again in 2009, my prediction is that the
economy will continue to contract in the first half
of the year and that the continuing problems in
the housing sector will limit any growth that does
occur. Therefore, my forecast is that the economy
will contract by 0.5 percent for all of 2009, that
unemployment will average 8 percent for the
year—which would be the highest rate since the
1982-84 recession—and that there will be almost no
change in prices.
I am relatively more optimistic about the
performance of the Kentucky economy in the
coming year in the state. While I believe that
manufacturing employment will continue to decline
in the coming year, I feel that the relative strength
of the housing market in Kentucky will mean that
the Kentucky economy will grow by approximately
0.5 percent in 2009. However, I do expect that the
unemployment rate in Kentucky will grow to 8.2
percent for the year and will be slightly above the
unemployment rate for the nation.
Of course any optimism about the performance
of the Kentucky economy should be tempered by
the recognition that Kentucky remains one of the
poorest states in the country and that this dubious
distinction is unlikely to change in the near future.
Kentucky’s main problem is that Kentucky’s
workforce remains one of the least educated
workforces in the country. It is this structural
problem that policy makers should focus on fixing
if they hope to raise the standard of living in the
state. Unfortunately, given the budgetary problem
facing the state, it is unlikely that any solution to
this problem will be developed in the near future.
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Citizens’ Budget Choices for the State of
Kentucky
Brandon C. Koford
Efficient allocation of public funds depends on good information about citizens’
values of public programs. The present paper reports on an effort to elicit citizens’
preferences over public spending categories in Kentucky. The data come from a
representative sample of Kentucky residents surveyed in the summer of 2007. Estimates
show that individuals place highest value on education, followed by health care.

Introduction

The role of citizens in public budgeting
decisions is of interest in a form of representative
government. While citizen participation may have
to fight a culture of public budgeting in which
elected officials and administrators work to establish
budget priorities, the general consensus is that the
public should be involved in the budget process.
One example of an elected official seeking citizen
input in budget decisions in Kentucky includes
then Governor Ernie Fletcher’s 2006-2007 town
hall meeting tour to discuss the desires of the
citizenry on how to best use state budget dollars.
Former Governor Fletcher used one of the
many methods for involving citizens in the budget
budgeting process. Others include focus groups,
issue advisory boards, open house informational
discussions, traditional public meetings, and survey
research. Additionally, Donahue et al. (2008) note
the increasing use of surveys by local government
to assess the level of citizen satisfaction with
governments services. The primary problems with
these traditional methods of citizen involvement are
that many fail to obtain a representative sample,
and almost all fail to include a budget constraint.
Including a budget constraint when obtaining
citizens’ input over budgetary decisions has at least
two advantages. First, citizens faced with a budget
constraint must trade off support for some programs
with lack of support for others. In other words,
the budget constraint imposes the condition that
citizens cannot have more of everything. Second,
the budget constraint adds a degree of realism
for citizens participating in the budget process.
The purpose of the current work is to describe
the results of an effort to involve citizens of
Kentucky in the budget process through a widely
distributed survey. The method uses state of the art
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techniques for survey research and also incorporates
a budget constraint into citizens’ decision making.
The technique involves surveying a representative
sample of Kentucky as well as asking respondents
to allocate a $100 million expansion to a public
budget among the categories contained in the
budget. The dollar amount of the expansion is
clearly indicated, and thus respondents are asked
to make decisions while facing the public budget
constraint. Asking citizens to make choices across
budget categories in this fashion provides a measure
of citizens’ preferences for state spending categories.
The technique has several advantages for
eliciting citizens’ preferences. First, the method
requires respondents to make decisions in the
context of a budget constraint. This method
adds realism to the survey design and results in
more credible responses. Second, the technique
provides survey respondents with relevant
information for making decisions over public
budget categories. Specifically, respondents are
given a description of the programs funded by each
budget category and the fixed budget expansion
to be allocated across the categories. Finally, the
technique handles concerns about representative
participation through random sampling methods.

Survey

Elicitation of citizens’ preferences over spending
categories takes place within the context of a survey
distributed across the state of Kentucky. After
a brief introduction, respondents are provided
with a scenario in which they are prompted to
allocate a surplus $100 million in the Kentucky
Overall State Budget among the categories
within the budget. Specifically the survey read:
Please consider the budget categories below. If you were
making the choices for the state of Kentucky and an extra $100
million were available to be added to the existing budgets,
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Figure 1. Example of Allocation Exercise for Overall State Budget

CHOICES FOR KENTUCKY’S OVERALL STATE BUDGET
Please consider the budget categories below. If you were making the choices for the state
of Kentucky and an extra $100 million were available to be added to the existing budgets,
how much of the $100 million would you put in each of the following budget categories?
If you put more money into a given area, the programs in that area would be expanded. If
no money is allocated to a given area, programs would be maintained at current levels.
The total should add up to 100.
1

$______

2

$______

3

$______

4

$______

5

$______

6

$______

7

$______

8

$______

9

$______

10

$______

11

$______

12

$______

13
14

18

AGRICULTURE: Animal health, livestock services, and pest
management
CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS: State libraries, arts and humanities,
museums, and historical societies.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: Industrial development, marketing
information, community and regional planning, housing and building
construction.
ENVIRONMENT: Air and water pollution prevention, waste
management, mining and minerals, forestry, conservation, and energy
efficiency.
FINANCE AND REVENUE: Investment and debt management,
computer information systems, property valuation, taxation and
collection.
HEALTH CARE: Medicare, Medicaid, county health departments,
mental health services, and services for the disabled.
HUMAN RESOURCES: Social services, food stamps, and aid to
families with dependent children.
JUSTICE: Jails and correctional systems, state police, and the courts.
LABOR AND WORKER’S COMPENSATION: Occupational safety
and health payments to workers suffering job-related injuries and
diseases
NATIONAL GUARD: Military affairs, veterans affairs, and disaster
relief.
SCHOOLS: Public elementary, middle, and high school construction
and maintenance, teacher salaries and retirement system, and Kentucky
Educational Television.
TOURISM: State parks, fish and wildlife programs, and the state fair.

TRANSPORTATION: Highway construction and maintenance,
airports, and public transportation.
UNIVERSITIES: State university and community college construction
$______
and maintenance, faculty/staff salaries, research, and student loans.
PLEASE MAKE SURE THE TOTAL ADDS UP TO $100
$______

Center for Business and Economic Research

Citizens’ Budget Choices for the State of Kentucky

Figure 2. Example of Allocation Exercise for Overall Public Education Budget
CHOICES FOR KENTUCKY’S OVERALL PUBLIC EDUCATIONAL BUDGET
Budget choices are made all the time within state agencies. If you were making the
choices for the education budget for the state of Kentucky and an extra $100 million were
available to be added to the budget categories shown below, how much of the $100
million would you put in each category? If you put more money into a given category,
the programs in that category would be expanded. If no money is allocated to a given
category, programs would be maintained at current levels. The total should add up to
100.

1

$______

2

$______

3

$______

4

$______

LOCAL K-12 PUBLIC SCHOOLS: Expenditures in this category are used
to fund teaching and learning programs, tutoring services, nutrition and health
services, student assessment programs, construction of new buildings, and
purchases of new technology for local K-12 public schools.
STATE 4-YEAR COLLEGES: Expenditures in this category are used to
fund instruction, research, public service, academic support,
scholarships/fellowships, construction of new buildings, and purchases of
new technology at the state 4-year colleges such as the University of
Kentucky, the University of Louisville, and the regional state universities.
KENTUCKY COMMUNITY AND TECHNICAL COLLEGE
SYSTEM: Expenditures in this category are used to fund instruction, public
service, academic support, scholarships/fellowships, construction of new
buildings, and purchases of new technology for the Kentucky Community
and Technical College System.
VOCATIONAL AND WORK FORCE TRAINING PROGRAMS:
Expenditures in this category are used to fund education and technical
training to new and existing workers to match the needs of Kentucky
businesses and industry.

PLEASE MAKE SURE THE TOTAL ADDS UP TO $100

how much of the $100 million would you put in each of the
following budget categories? If you put more money into
a given area, the programs in that area would be expanded.
If no money is allocated to a given area, programs would be
maintained at current levels. The total should add up to 100.

For an example of the entire allocation exercise,
see Figure 1. Budget categories were selected to
represent general budget areas in the Kentucky State
Executive Budget. Each category is accompanied by
a description of the services funded by the category.
Respondents are told that allocating money to a given
budget would allow the programs in that category
to expand beyond current levels. If the respondent
allocated no money to a given budget category, they
were told that the programs in that category would
be maintained at current levels. A similar allocation
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exercise is replicated for the Public Education Budget
(see Figure 2). Because the respondent is given an
extra $100 million in public funds, each allocation is
made in the context of this explicit budget constraint.
The survey was distributed June and July
of 2007 by the survey research firm Knowledge
Networks. The sample was drawn based on random
digit dialing techniques and random white pages
sampling in the state of Kentucky. A total of 10,370
households were invited to complete the survey. Of
those surveys mailed, 804 were undeliverable. A
total of 2,956 surveys were returned for a response
rate of 31 percent (2,956 / 9,566). The estimation
sample used for data analysis in this context was
further adjusted for individuals under the age of 18
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Table 1. Demographics of KCTCS Survey vs. American Community Survey 2005 for Kentucky†
American
KCTCS Survey Community
Survey 2005
Female
54.42%
51.87%
Gender
Age

18-29
30-39
40-49
50-64
65 or over

23.34%
16.70%
21.08%
26.41%
12.47%

20.93%
18.38%
20.51%
24.12%
16.04%

Race

White

89.82%

90.97%

Education

Less than High School Diploma
High School Diploma or Equivalent
Some College
Associate Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Master's Degree or Beyond

13.13%
32.94%
21.39%
9.22%
13.60%
9.72%

20.65%
34.93%
20.30%
6.30%
11.06%
6.76%

Household Income

Under $25,000
$25,000 - $39,999
$40,000 - $59,999
$60,000 - $99999
$100,000 or more

34.00%
19.45%
20.07%
17.63%
8.84%

35.02%
18.11%
18.72%
18.29%
9.86%

†Both the KCTCS Survey statistics and the American Community Survey statistics are for those
individuals 18 years old or over. KCTCS Survey statistics are based on the estimation sample n =
1706.
Table 2. Allocations for Kentucky's Overall State Budget ($100 Million Increment)
Budget Category
Mean
Standard Deviation
Schools

$16.2

12.3

Health Care

$14.3

10.9

Universities

$10.1

8.4

Environment

$8.0

6.9

Economic Development
Transportation

$7.0
$6.8

7.8
6.4

National Guard

$6.2

6.3

Agriculture
Human Resources

$5.6
$5.5

6.4
6.2

Cultural Institutions
Justice
Labor and Worker's Compensation

$4.6
$4.6
$4.4

5.2
4.9
5.1

Tourism

$3.9

4.3

Finance and Revenue

$2.9

4.2

Allocations that are significantly different at the 5 percent level are set apart by a shaded row.
Allocations that are above (below) the double lines are greater (less) than the proportional allocation of
$7.1 million. n = 1706.
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Table 3. Allocations for Kentucky's Public Education Budget ($100 Million Increment)
Budget Category
Mean
Standard Deviation
Local K-12 Public Schools

$33.8

14.7

State 4-Year Colleges
KCTCS

$22.6
$22.4

9.8
8.1

Vocational and Work Force Training Programs

$21.2

9.8

Allocations that are significantly different are set apart by a shaded row. Allocations that are above (below)
the double lines are greater (less) than the proportional allocation of $25 million. n = 1706.

and for surveys with incomplete or missing
data. The final estimation sample contained
1,706 usable observations. Table 1 compares
demographic information for the estimation
sample to Kentucky as a whole using data from
the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey
2005. The table shows that the gender, age, race,
education, and income demographics of the survey
sample are representative of the state as a whole.
Dillman (2007) notes two important items that put

the survey’s response rate in context. First, general
populations surveys, such as the one discussed
here, typically have lower response rates than
surveys administered to specific subpopulations—
attendees to a particular school or employees of
a specific firm, for example. Second, response
rates typically decline with survey length and
complexity. The survey described herein contained
14 pages, 28 questions, with several questions
requiring respondents to allocate dollars over as

Table 4. Comparison Between Actual Budget Totals and Survey Respondents' Allocations: Overall State Budget
2007 Percent

2007 Ranking

Budget Survey

Survey Ranking

Health Care

28.21%

1

14.30%

2

Schools

24.17%

2

16.20%

1

Universities

21.45%

3

10.00%

3

Transportation

10.52%

4

6.80%

6

Human Resources

4.61%

5

5.50%

9

Justice

3.91%

6

4.60%

10

Finance and Revenue

2.98%

7

2.90%

14

Labor and Worker's
Compensation

1.10%

8

4.40%

12

Cultural Institutions

0.99%

9

4.60%

11

Environment

0.98%

10

8.00%

4

National Guard

0.56%

11

6.20%

7

Agriculture

0.33%

12

5.60%

8

Economic Development

0.13%

13

7.00%

5

Tourism

0.07%

14

3.90%

13
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Table 5. Comparison Between Actual Budget Totals and Survey Respondents' Allocations: Public Education Budget
2007 Percent

2007 Ranking

Budget Survey

Survey Ranking

Local K-12 Public Schools

50.95%

1

33.80%

1

State 4-Year Colleges

41.31%

2

22.60%

2

Kentucky Community and
Technical College System
Vocational and Work Force
Training Programs

5.71%

3

22.40%

3

2.03%

4

21.20%

4

many as 14 categories. Seen in the context of the
survey’s length and complexity, the response rate
is high. In addition, similar demographics between
respondents and the state as a whole provide
reassuring evidence that the sample is representative.

Results

The budget allocations were used to obtain
respondents’ relative valuations on programs that
make up the budget. Respondents’ allocations
for the Overall State Budget Categories are
presented in Table 2. The table shows citizens’
strong preference for education in the state. The
“Schools” category received the largest portion of
the surplus funds with an average of $16 million.

The average respondent also cares a great deal
about health care as evidenced by their allocation
of a substantial portion of the additional funds for
the “Health Care” category, which is comprised
of state financed health care such as Medicaid
and mental health services. The “Universities”
category received the third highest allocation with
a $10 million average allocation. Education and
health care are the two biggest priorities for the
typical respondent. All other budget categories
would receive substantially less money than
these programs, with the “Finance and Revenue”
category receiving the fewest dollars at $3 million.
Next, Kentucky citizens’ views on education
spending are explored in more detail. Specifically,

Table 6. Comparisons Between Allocations for Kentucky's Overall State Budget: 2007 & 1995
Budget Category
2007 Mean
2007 Rank
1995 Mean
1995 Rank
Education†

$26.3

1

18.0

1

Health Care

$14.3

2

12.1

2

Environment

$8.0

3

8.7

3

Economic Development

$7.0

4

7.5

6

Transportation

$6.8

5

8.6

4

National Guard

$6.2

6

4.4

11

Agriculture

$5.6

7

5.6

8

Human Resources

$5.5

8

5.7

7

Cultural Institutions

$4.6

9

4.0

12

Justice

$4.6

10

8.2

5

Labor and Worker's Compensation

$4.4

11

5.2

9

Tourism

$3.9

12

5.1

10

Finance and Revenue

$2.9

13

3.4

13

†To be comparable with the 1995 survey, the 2007 survey's Schools and Universities categories were combined
into the single Education category.
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the mean allocation for each category of the Public
Education Budget is presented in Table 3. The
“Local K-12 Public School” category receives
the most out of any category with an average
allocation of $34 million. The K-12 schools likely
received the largest increase in resources because
most citizens in Kentucky have had some personal
interaction with K-12 schools, whereas a much
smaller percentage have attended a public post
secondary school. According to the American
Community Survey 2005, 79 percent of people 25
years and over had at least graduated from high
school while only 19 percent had a bachelor’s
degree or higher. The remaining three categories –
“Vocational and Work Force Training Programs,”
“Kentucky Community and Technical College
System” (KCTCS), and “State Four-year Colleges”
would receive approximately the same allocation in
funding of roughly $22 million per program. This
result implies citizens prefer that vocational / work
force training programs, KCTCS and the state’s fouryear colleges grow at approximately the same rate.
It is interesting to compare respondents’
allocations with the allocations of the actual
budget. Tables 4 and 5 compare actual budget
figures for the 2007 Kentucky State Budget to
respondents’ allocations for the additional $100
million. Interestingly in Table 4, the top three
spending categories in the 2007 actual Overall State
Budget are also the categories receiving the three
highest allocations from respondents. Similarly, the
“Tourism” category ranks low in the actual budget
and in respondents’ allocations. Table 5 shows
the similarity between the actual budget ranking
and respondent ranking for the Public Education
Budget. The rankings match perfectly even though
magnitudes vary substantially. In general, it
appears that respondents’ rank orderings are similar
to the rank order of the actual budget. The primary
difference between the two is that respondents tend
to allocate more evenly than the state government.
In order to obtain a sense of respondents’
preferences over time, a comparison between the
current survey results and results obtained from the
University of Kentucky’s Center for Business and
Economic Research in 1995 (Blomquist et al. 2004)
is also performed. The results are striking. Table
6 shows that after 12 years, the top three categories
receiving the most dollars allocated remain the
same. In addition, of the top five allocations in 2007,
four are in the top five in 1995. Furthermore, the fifth
category, “Economic Development,” was ranked
sixth in 1995. Kentuckians place an emphasis on
education, health care and environmental programs,
and this preference appears to be stable over time.
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Conclusion

The work here has presented a method for
eliciting citizens’ preferences over state spending
categories. One limitation of the work in the
context of the current economic climate is that
the survey focuses on an expansion in spending
areas. Indeed, when the survey was written, an
expansion seemed to be appropriate considering
Kentucky’s budget surpluses in fiscal years 2005
and 2006. The state legislatures of the 2008-2010
budgetary session faced a very different concern,
however. Instead of surplus funds, legislatures
were faced with the task of how to trim budgets in
order to adjust the state’s budget shortfall. Many
strategies were discussed and few public programs
were spared cuts in funding. Understanding the
preferences of citizens when faced with decisions
to cut programs would result in a public more
satisfied, or less dissatisfied, with public programs.
Although the present work did not ask
respondents about a budget shortfall, clearly lessons
can be learned from the preferences elicited from
citizens in the survey. There appears to be a strong
preference for allocating dollars to educational
programs. This preference appears in both 1995 and
2007. Similarly, respondents allocate fewest dollars
to the “Finance and Revenue” category in both years.
One possible way of using the elicited preference
information would be to assume that citizens
would prefer the largest budget cuts to occur in
categories to which they allocated the fewest dollars
. If that assumption holds true, then citizens’
preferences would indicate that a budget shortfall
be address by cutting the most funds from the
“Finance and Revenue category”. The category
to receive the fewest budget cuts would be
the “Schools” category. Ultimately if budget
actions in response to a budget shortfall are to be
consistent with the preferences of the citizenry, a
survey questioning citizens on their preferences
regarding budget cuts would be appropriate.
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Kentucky’s Urban/Rural Landscape:

What is driving the differences in wealth across Kentucky?
Alison F. Davis
Kentucky has persistently trailed behind its peer states in income and income growth,
regardless of its relatively strong growth in the urban areas. It appears that Kentucky lags
behind because of slow growth in its rural communities. This article empirically addresses
the differences between the urban and rural counties of Kentucky. There is evidence that
there are significant differences in many socio-economic and quality of life indicators
between the rural and urban counties. In addition, while we typically classify Kentucky as
either urban or rural, there is further significant variation among just the rural counties.
Preliminary evidence suggests that the issues that plague rural areas, such as labor force
participation rates, educational attainment levels, and lack of health insurance coverage,
negatively influence the average household income in a county. Changes in industry,
such as the loss of manufacturing or mining jobs, did not appear to be significantly related
to income. Therefore, the results provide support for rural economic development policy
to be directed towards the individual, specifically the improvement of workforce skills.

I. Introduction

variables on per capita income at the county level.
Kentucky is composed of 120 counties where
thirty-five counties are classified as urban and
the remaining 85 counties are rural based on
the Department of Agriculture’s Urban-Rural
continuum codes (sometimes called Beale codes)
produced by their Economic Research Service
(ERS). These codes from 1 (most urban) to 9 (most
rural) allow counties to be ranked on their degree
of rurality. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of
rurality across Kentucky. Most of the rural areas
are in Eastern, South Central and far Western
Kentucky.

While some of Kentucky’s neighboring states
have improved their status in per capita income,
Kentucky has remained stagnant. Kentucky, with a
per capita income of $31,111, is currently ranked 46th
in the nation with only South Carolina, Arkansas,
West Virginia, and Mississippi faring worse. 1
However, there are vast differences across the rural
and urban areas of Kentucky that are driving this
result. The urban areas of Kentucky have witnessed
significant growth; in some instances outpacing the
growth of many of the urban areas in Kentucky’s
bordering states. Sanford and Troske (2007) found
that the lack of progress in Kentucky is largely
determined by the low level of growth in the rural
areas of Kentucky, particularly in
Figure 1: Kentucky’s Urban/Rural Landscape
Eastern Kentucky. Policy that is
created to address the economic
issues of Kentucky, treating
the state as a whole, will likely
be unsuccessful because of the
large degree of heterogeneity
in its people, industry, and
landscape. This paper examines
the differences between urban
and rural Kentucky and estimates
the impact of demographic,
Source: Author’s calculations from ERS Urban Rural Continuum Codes, 2003
economic, and quality of life
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Figure 2: Kentucky Population Change 2000 - 2006

Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 – 2006.

II. Kentucky Demographics

individuals twentyfive years of age or
older with at least a
high school degree.
In Eastern and South
Central Kentucky,
there are numerous
counties where
the high school
graduation rate is
hovering around
50 to 65%. These
numbers have been
improving over
time, but many of
the rural areas of
Kentucky still fall

short of the national average.
Approximately 4.2 million people live in
Figure 4 provides an interesting depiction of
Kentucky. The largest urban areas account for about
the role age might play in rural economies. The
2.4 million people; thus there are about 1.8 million
Western portion of the state, where agriculture still
residents living in rural areas of Kentucky.2 From
plays a large role in economic development, has a
2000 – 2006 there has been a slight outmigration
high percentage of older individuals (aged 65 and
of population from areas in Eastern Kentucky and
older). These senior citizens are likely either still
Western Kentucky and a large influx of people into
working on the farm or are retired. The future of
Kentucky’s metropolitan areas. From Figure 2, we
agriculture is uncertain when there are not future
cannot determine if the rural residents are moving
generations willing to take over the family farm.
into the Kentucky cities or are instead moving out
Also one can assume that many Kentuckians would
of the state.
like to retire where they were born, particularly in
Education has always been considered the
these rural areas of Kentucky where land and nature
driving factor in economic growth in Kentucky.
are at its best. However, many of these areas lack the
Many believe that implementing policies that would
infrastructure to support a retirement community,
improve high school graduation rates would have
such as health facilities and transportation services,
an enormous impact on the incomes of rural areas.
and thus, at their current state, are not attractive to
Of course, no such policy exists in any state to
older individuals.
combat high school
dropout rates
Figure 3: Percentage of individuals, 25 years of age or older,
because researchers
with at least a high school degree
cannot explain why
education rates
are low; without
understanding the
cause, it is impossible
to adequately
address the problem.
Figure 3 illustrates
the distribution
of education as
measured by the
average percentage of
Source: Author’s Calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000
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III. Agriculture
in Kentucky

Figure 4: Percentage of population aged 65 and older

Kentucky’s rural
areas were at one
time dominated by
agricultural activity.
Thus, when describing
activity at the county
level, it is important to
recognize the role of Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000
agriculture in today’s
Currently, Kentucky’s top five agricultural
economy. In the past, tobacco production was
commodities are3:
typically a successful enterprise, regardless of
farm acreage. The livestock industry and the
1. Cattle and Calves ($623 Million)
equine markets also contributed to farm income.
2. Poultry and Eggs ($561 Million)
The tobacco buyout initiated in 2005 changed the
3. Grains and Oilseeds ($518 Million)
agricultural landscape in Kentucky. The tobacco
4. Horses, ponies, donkeys and mules ($491
buyout program injected millions of dollars into
Million)
rural areas as a result of land being taken from
5. Tobacco ($404 Million)
tobacco production because of changes in price floors
and quotas. The intended goal was to promote local
Overall, a large majority of the counties (83 of
economic development either through new non120) either realized a substantial or moderate loss
agricultural enterprises or other value-added, new
in agriculture, as measured by the difference in
agricultural opportunities in rural areas. The results
the market value of goods sold from 1997 to 2002
from this relatively new program on Kentucky
(Figure 5). All over the country, the age of the
agriculture cannot be identified until at least the
average farmer is in the fifties, and when they retire,
2007 Census of Agriculture data are released. In
there are not new farmers willing to take over. Thus,
addition, because of the newness of the program,
counties that used to rely on agriculture for a large
significant impacts on a county’s economy in terms
portion of their income must turn to other industries
of jobs and income changes are not expected to be
for job and wealth creation.
visible for quite some time.

Figure 5: Change in market value of agricultural goods
sold, 1997 to 2002

Source: Author’s calculations from National Agricultural Statistics Service, 1997 and 2002

Kentucky Annual Economic Report 2009

27

Kentucky’s Urban/Rural Landscape: What is driving the differences in wealth across Kentucky?

Figure 6: Median household income

Economists and policy makers
have tried to understand the reasons
behind lagging incomes. The most
obvious explanation was described
earlier, the low levels of education
attainment rates. However, there are
other factors that likely play a role as
well. One of the striking results is the
labor force participation rate of males,
ages 18 to 65. This is considered the
most likely subset of the population to
be both in the labor force and working.
Figure 8 shows that in many Eastern
Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2004
Kentucky counties, over 50% of men
of working age are not considered part
of the labor force. In two counties, over 60% of the
IV. Kentucky’s Economic Situation
men are not part of the labor force. This suggests
As mentioned in the introduction,
Figure 7: Percentage of all people in Poverty
Kentucky ranks in the bottom 10%
nationally in per capita income.
Over the decades this ranking has
not changed. Regardless of the
high growth in the urban areas and
the moderate to slight growth in
the rural areas, Kentucky has not
been able to outpace its Southern
neighbors. Figure 6 shows a very
distinct delineation of income
regions. Appalachian and South
Central Kentucky ranks the lowest,
followed by Western Kentucky and Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2004
then Central Kentucky. As would
that only 40% to 50% of men of working age are
be expected, poverty levels follow a very similar
receiving a paycheck; others either have no source
trend (Figure 7).
of income or are receiving disability payments and/
or public assistance.
Figure 8: Percentage of Kentucky males not in the
The business climate of any
labor force
area can be measured in several
ways. For example, the value of
manufacturing exports, the number
of new establishments, and changes in
payroll are all possible indicators. To
evaluate the entrepreneurial climate,
the number of patents and the number
of nonemployee establishments are
measured.
The value of manufacturing
exports does not appear to follow a
predicted pattern (Figure 9). Eastern
Kentucky and some areas of Western
Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000
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Kentucky have very little if not zero
manufacturing exports. Counties on the
Tennessee border and the Ohio River
have higher levels of exports as well as
some of the urban counties. Many rural
counties did not receive a single patent in
1999 (Figure 10), the most recent year of
data available. It is of little surprise that
the counties with higher levels of patents
per capita are in the metropolitan areas
where the universities and high-tech firms
are located. In addition, rural counties
have a smaller share of nonemployment
establishments, suggesting a smaller
number of entrepreneurs (Figure 11).

Figure 9: Manufacturing exports per capita

Source: Author’s calculations from Economic Census, 2002

Figure 10: Patents per capita

Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Patents Office, 1999

Figure 11: Nonemployer Establishments Per Capita

Source: Author’s calculations from Economic Census, 2002 Nonemployer Statistics
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Figure 12: Percentage of individuals working
within county of residence

Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000

V. Kentucky’s Quality of Life

between necessity
and choice. Those
who live near urban
counties might
have made the job
choice first and then
purchased a home
in a surrounding
county. In rural
counties, residents
have chosen where
to live first and then
must commute
out of the county
because of limited
job selection.
Another factor
contributing to
quality of life is health status. There are numerous
indicators that measure health status: lack of physical
activity, prevalence of obesity, smoking rates, cancer
rates, access to primary care, and the percentage
uninsured. Figure 13 illustrates the uninsured rates
across Kentucky. High rates of uninsured can be
found in Eastern and South Central Kentucky. The
problems of not having health insurance are twofold. One, individuals do not seek preventative care
and only visit a health care provider after they are
already ill or in an emergency situation. Second, the
uninsured often visit public hospitals for non-life
threatening issues and thus put a strain on hospital
finances when they are unable to pay their bill.

There are other factors that indicate the
satisfaction of an individual living in a particular
county or region besides income-related measures.
These indicators include accessibility, transportation,
crime, health, and natural amenities. Figures 12
and 13 provide a brief overview of how some of
these indicators vary over the state and throughout
different rural regions. Commuting long distances
takes time away from other activities. Figure 12 is
interesting in that it has several interpretations. In the
counties that surround the three major metropolitan
areas, Lexington, Louisville, and Northern Kentucky,
many individuals commute out of their county
into an urban county. Thus we expect that
fewer people would be
Figure 13: Percentage of individuals
working in their county
health insurance
of residence. However,
once we move out to
the rural counties,
many individuals
are commuting out
of their county either
to work in the urban
areas or commuting to
surrounding counties
because the jobs are
not available within
their own county.
Essentially, this figure
shows that there might
Source: Author’s calculations from www.kentuckyhealthfacts.org, 2007
be a differentiation
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Table 1: Urban and Rural Demographic, Economic, and Quality Of Life Differences
Urban Average

Rural Average

Population, 2005

50,498

16,401

Population 5 years in same house, (1995-2000 Percentage)

54.47%

61.95%

Variable

Demographic Variables

Population per square mile, 2000

221.76

61.25

High school degree or more (Percentage, 2000)

79.72%

67.30%

Aged 65 and older (Percentage, 2000)

11.70%

13.96%

People of all ages in poverty - percent 2004

13.22%

20.55%

Median value of specified owner-occupied housing units, 2000

$90,403

$61,925

Median household income 2004

$42,148

$29,847

Males not in labor force (Percentage)

27.72%

39.17%

Residents working within county (Percentage)

52.32%

61.90%

Federal Government expenditure per capita FY, 2004

$5,873

$7,164

Economic/Business Variables

Patents Per Capita

0.000149

0.00003

Not in labor force (Percentage)

35.70%

46.03%

Receiving Public assistance (Percentage)

2.95%

5.17%

Civilian labor force unemployment rate, 2006

5.50%

6.80%

Manufacturing value of shipments, per capita, 2002

$18,760

$11,011

Wholesale sales of establishments with payroll, per capita, 2002

$16,096

$2,293

Retail trade sales of establishments with payroll per capita, 2002

$7,826

$6,852

Working in White Collar job (Percentage)

27.09%

25.79%

25.88

26.96

12.42%

15.92%

Additional Quality of Life Indicators
Average travel time to work for workers 16 years, 2000
Uninsured Rate, 2007 (Percentage)
Drug Arrests (Per 100,000 population)

940

1089

Crime Per Capita

0.036

0.019

Mortality Rates (Per 100,000 population)

976.8

1051.7

VI. The Determinants of Per-Capita
Income: A County-Level Study
The previous section used many illustrations
to measure the heterogeneity of Kentucky’s
residents across all counties. In this section, we
measure demographic, economic, and quality of
life differences between urban and rural areas.
Furthermore, we breakdown Kentucky’s rural
areas into “rural” and “very rural” to test if there
are even substantial differences among Kentucky’s
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rural regions. As would be expected given the
figures above, the urban and rural areas exhibit
very different characteristics (Table 1). We will
just highlight a few points of interest. A larger
percentage of individuals remain where they were
five years ago in rural areas. This statistic suggests
that rural people are less mobile. This result is
not surprising, yet it does highlight the value that
individuals place on their rural communities and
that policies that are created to pull people away
from home might not work as effectively as we
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Table 2: Examining Differences Across Rural Counties
Very Rural
(Beale Codes 7-9)

Rural Average
(Beale Codes 4-6)

Population, 2005

14,434

20,841

Population 5 years in same house, (1995-2000 Percentage)

63.84%

57.90%

Population per square mile, 2000

52.26

80.57

High school degree or more (Percentage, 2000)

64.7%

72.7%

Aged 65 and older (Percentage, 2000)

14.04%

13.78%

22.3%

16.8%

Median value of owner-occupied housing units, 2000

$57,879

$70,614

Median household income 2004

Variable
Demographic Variables

Economic/Business Variables
People of all ages in poverty - percent 2004

$24,609

$31,537

Males not in labor force (Percentage)

42.0%

33.1%

Residents working within county (Percentage)

60.1%

64.4%

Federal Government expenditure per capita FY, 2004

$7,710

$6,910

0.34

1.07

48.5%

40.8%

Patents Per Capita
Not in labor force (Percentage)
Receiving Public assistance (Percentage)

5.9%

3.6%

Civilian labor force unemployment rate, 2006

7.11%

6.15%

Manufacturing value of shipments, per capita, 2002

$6,852

$17,012

Wholesale sales of establishments, per capita, 2002

$2,019

$2,688

Retail trade sales of establishments per capita, 2002

$6,881.8

$6,870.8

26.9%

23.4%

Average travel time to work for workers 16 years, 2000

27.75

25.25

Uninsured Rate (Percentage)

17.0%

13.6%

Drug Arrests (Per 100,000 population)

1063.4

1143.9

Working in White Collar job (Percentage)
Additional Quality of Life Indicators

Crime Per Capita

0.016

0.026

Mortality Rates (Per 100,000 population)

1063.3

1026.7

would believe. There are significantly higher rates
of public assistance, federal spending, poverty,
and unemployment in rural counties. In addition,
while drug arrests are higher in rural areas, crime
is lower.
We were also interested in examining differences
among rural counties. We have seen that urban
counties are quite different than rural but are there
discernible differences between rural counties with
rural-urban continuum codes between four and
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six (rural but could be close to an urban area) and
those that are between seven and nine (most rural).
Table 2 provides the averages for the same variables
as Table 1 but for the two different rural areas.
Using a difference in means t-test with α = 0.05,
those variables that were found to be significantly
different between the two rural areas are in bold.
There are few surprises in the results. In most
instances the very rural counties are significantly
more “distressed” in all three categories, particularly
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Table 3: Semilog Regression Results

Dependent Variable is Log Median Household Income†
Coefficients

Standard Error

9.4560

0.1471

Population Change (%)

0.0055

0.0012

Aged 65 and older (%)*

-0.0053

0.0031

High School Degree or more (%)

1.8723

0.1421

Not in Labor Force, male (%)

-0.3746

0.1137

Manufacturing Per Capita

0.0007

0.0003

White Collar Worker (%)

-0.2865

0.0988

Commute Within County of Residence (%)

-0.0024

0.0004

Uninsured Population (%)

-0.0088

0.0029

Crime Per Capita

0.5550

0.2448

Intercept

Demographic Indicators

Economic Indicators

Quality of Life Indicators

R = 0.9464
2

†

All variables listed are statistically significant with α = .05, except for variables denoted with an asterisk which is
significant at α = 0.10.

when measured with economic indicators.
Successful rural economic development policy
relies on understanding the factors that influence
the targeted intended outcome. In most instances,
policy is created to improve the wealth of a region’s
residents. Thus, in the section, we will investigate
what factors influence household income at the
county level. We will utilize the data in the previous
section because all of these variables are expected
to impact income, either directly or indirectly.
The results from the regression analysis are given
in Table 3. In total, there were 120 observations,
one representing each county in Kentucky. The
dependent variable was defined as the natural log of
median household income. We will briefly interpret
the results. All of the signs on the coefficients for
the three significant demographic variables were
as hypothesized. Population growth is typically
a consequence of a region successfully attracting
new residents. Individuals of working age would
likely only move to an area where job prospects were
promising, thus we would expect incomes to be
higher in these communities. Counties with a high
percentage of senior citizens are expected to have
lower incomes because senior citizens are typically
either not working or they are working part-time
at relatively lower incomes. Of course, areas with
higher educational attainments are associated with
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higher incomes on average. Small positive changes
in educational attainment will reap relatively large
income gains.
The results for the economic indicators suggest
that the higher the percentage of males not in the
labor force, the lower the median household income.
This result was anticipated and is believed to be a
very large influence on income. Improvements in
male labor-force participation rates are associated
with higher incomes.
We expected that white-collar workers earn on
average higher incomes than blue-collar workers
and therefore we would predict that counties with a
high percentage of white-collar workers would have
relatively higher household incomes. The results
indicated that this prediction only holds in urban
areas. In rural areas, white-collar workers likely get
paid below-average incomes for their profession
compared to urban areas, as well as belowprevailing wages in the blue-collar professions
paid to workers in rural counties. Counties with a
high value of manufacturing exports have higher
incomes. This result was expected for two reasons.
Manufacturing plants will likely hire some share
of local workers. The more valuable the produced
goods, the higher the incomes the firm will be able
to pay their workers. In addition, manufacturing
plants might also purchase some of their inputs
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locally, thus infusing the local economy with dollars
generated from a valuable export business.
There were three statistically significant qualityof-life indicators: the percentage of households
commuting within the county, the percentage of
uninsured individuals, and crime per capita. A
county with a large share of households working
within their county of residence will have lower
average income, all else held constant. This result
appears to support the notion that out of necessity
people leave their home county and commute to
surrounding counties or urban areas for work;
staying home results in lower incomes. Counties
with high levels of uninsured populations experience
lower levels of income. This variable could be a
proxy for a quality-of-job variable. Lower-quality
jobs are typically low paying and often do not
offer health insurance. Finally, areas with higher
crime will have higher incomes. This result was
not as hypothesized but this variable could also
be measuring other indicators that might describe
positive opportunities that you might also find in
an urban area, such as high growth and quality job
opportunities.

VII. Conclusion
In the past, we have explored Kentucky’s
standing in relation to the rest of the nation and
the surrounding southern states. However, little
has been done in the literature to examine how the
rural and urban areas of Kentucky differ from one
another. We have always known that we have at
least two distinct economies, the cities of Kentucky
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and the lagging rural areas. This study examines,
at the county level, the differences in demographic,
economic, and quality of life conditions for urban
and rural areas. We further differentiate the rural
areas by rural-urban continuum codes to explore
possible subtle differences that might be useful in
designing effective policy tools.
In addition, we also investigate the factors that
are correlated with household income at the county
level. This county-level study has not been done in
Kentucky before, and the results reveal that effective
economic development policies should target
the improvement in both high school education
attainment rates and male labor force participation
rates. Although it is uncertain exactly how to
achieve improvements in both of these variables,
we can conclude that there would likely be large
payoffs to the rural regions of Kentucky in terms
of higher incomes.
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The Aluminum Industry in Kentucky
John Garen, Christopher Jepsen, and Frank Scott
This article summarizes recent trends in Kentucky’s aluminum industry. Data from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics and the Census Bureau show that employment and compensation in the
industry have either held steady or declined in recent years. A similar trend can be seen for output,
although productivity has grown substantially. Finally, safety statistics have no clear pattern.

I. Introduction
The aluminum industry has a substantial
presence in Kentucky. In general, the state has
a larger share of its workforce in manufacturing
compared to the national average (Sanford and
Troske, 2007). The aluminum industry is a
major component of manufacturing, especially
in Kentucky. Aluminum products differ widely
in their nature, their production processes, and
their level of technology. Examples of aluminum
products include aluminum door and window
frames in construction, high-tech aluminum alloys
used in airplanes, aluminum foil and packaging
products, aluminum ladders and flashlights, and
aluminum water bottles.
The North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) contains seven industry
classifications related to aluminum manufacturing.
Two categories deal with the production of
aluminum. In primary aluminum production,
alumina is smelted to produce primary aluminum.
In secondary smelting and alloying of aluminum,
aluminum scrap, and usually some primary
aluminum as well, is smelted and alloyed into
aluminum billets and other forms of commodity
aluminum. The remaining five NAICS codes are
for different aluminum manufacturing methods
and products. They are: (1) sheet, plate, and foil
manufacturing, (2) extruded product manufacturing,
(3) other aluminum rolling and drawing, (4) diecasting foundries, and (5) foundries except diecasting.
Of these seven industries, four have a substantial
presence in Kentucky. Primary aluminum
production is rare in the United States. Although
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Kentucky does contain a small number of primary
aluminum producers, the number is too small to
allow the government to publish state-level statistics
on primary aluminum production in Kentucky.1
These primary smelters have a production capacity
that equals approximately 16 percent of the U.S.
primary smelting capacity (Kentucky Cabinet
for Economic Development, 2008). Furthermore,
these smelters have a workforce in excess of 1,000
employees.
State-level statistics also are not available for
the broad category of other aluminum rolling and
drawing, as well as for the category of foundries
except die-casting. These two sectors appear to be
smaller – in terms of workforce and production –
than the other NAICS codes (Kentucky Cabinet for
Economic Development, 2008). Therefore, we focus
on the remaining four industry classifications for
Kentucky. In this article, we discuss employment
and compensation; productivity and output; and
safety for each of these five NAICS codes. The focus
is on recent trends in these areas. The Kentucky
Cabinet for Economic Development (2008) provides
detailed information on the state’s aluminum
industry, with a focus on the current status of the
industry (as of 2008).
Figure 1 illustrates the presence of these
industries in Kentucky. Each of the five sectors has
multiple plants in Kentucky. Most of the plants are
located near limited-access roadways (i.e. interstates
and parkways), and several are located near the
Ohio River. Louisville, Owensboro, and Henderson
have multiple plants located in or near the city. In
contrast, Lexington has only one secondary smelter,
and the Kentucky suburbs of Cincinnati have no
plants in these five sectors.

35

The Aluminum Industry in Kentucky
Figure 1: Aluminum Plant Locations in Kentucky

Source: Authors’ calculations.

II. Employment and Compensation
Figure 2 shows recent trends in employment
for Kentucky’s aluminum industry using data from
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Although
die-cast foundries were the sector with the largest
employment in 2001, with nearly 4,000 employees
in 2001, employment dropped to just above 2,000
employees in 2007. This decline in employment
is matched with a decline in the number of
establishments, which declined from 9 in 2001 to
5 in 2007.
The sheet, plate, and foil sector has had
relatively constant employment over the period,
ranging from 2,200 to 2,400. However, the number
of establishments has declined from 9 to 6 over
the period. Employment is much smaller in
the secondary smelting and extruded products
classifications, where employment in each sector has
hovered around 400 employees over the time period.
The number of establishments has also remained
relatively constant in each classification.
Looking at all four sectors together, we see
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that employment has declined from over 6,600
employees in 2002 to approximately 5,200 employees
in 2007, a decline of more than 27 percent. As Figure
2 illustrates, this decline is being driven by the
decreased employment in die cast foundries; in other
sectors, employment was relatively constant.
Unfortunately, monthly data on employment
in these sectors is not available, either for Kentucky
or the nation as a whole. At this time, we cannot
measure the extent of the effects of the current
economic downturn on employment in these sectors
of Kentucky’s aluminum industry. However,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics has shown that
manufacturing employment for durable goods,
which is likely correlated with employment in
the Kentucky aluminum industry, has declined in
August and September of 2008, in Kentucky as well
as nationally.
Next, we look at average annual pay in each
sector of Kentucky’s aluminum industry. Figure 3
looks at trends in average pay by sector. Average pay
varied across the four aluminum sectors, although
it was relatively constant over the period. Average
pay in sheet, plate, and foil grew substantially
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Figure 2: Employment in Kentucky Aluminum Industry
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between 2005 and 2006 but was otherwise around
$60,000 per worker (in 2006 dollars). Secondary
smelting pay hovered around $50,000 per worker,
with a slight decline between 2004 and 2005. Diecast foundries and extrusions had the lowest average
pay, less than $40,000 per worker by 2006. Both
sectors had declines in average pay toward the end
of the period.
In terms of average annual pay, workers in
Kentucky’s aluminum industry compare favorably
with average annual pay for all private workers in
Kentucky or nationally. The average annual pay
for all private-sector workers in Kentucky was
approximately $35,000 in 2007. Thus, workers in

Kentucky’s aluminum industry have higher annual
pay than the state average. The national average
was around $43,000 in 2007, which is below each
sector except die-cast foundries.

III. Productivity and Output
We now turn to productivity and output
statistics for Kentucky’s aluminum industry. Figure
4 contains productivity information for the United
States as a whole, as the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) – our source for productivity data – does not
publish state-level productivity statistics. The figure
contains output per worker on a scale where the

Figure 3: Average Annual Pay for Workers in Kentucky Aluminum Industry
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1997 level is equal to 100. Thus, the statistics can
be interpreted in terms of increases or decreases
compared to 1997 levels. The BLS reports data
for sectors of the aluminum industry, “Alumina
and Aluminum Production and Processing” and
“Nonferrous metal foundries”. In terms of the
NAICS codes, the production and processing
category includes primary and secondary smelting;
sheet, plate, and foil, and extrusions. The foundries
category includes aluminum foundries, both diecast and non-die-cast, as well as other nonferrous
metals such as brass, bronze, and copper.
The figure illustrates that productivity in the
production and processing sector has increased
dramatically starting in 2001. In 2006, output
per worker was 50 percent greater than it was in
1997. For foundries, output per worker increased
substantially between 2001 and 2002, followed by
a minor increase between 2001 and 2006. Over
the last decade, output per worker has increased
23 percent. In both sectors, productivity actually
decreased between 1999 and 2001. Thus, one
possible explanation for the lack of growth in
employment has been the increase in productivity.
Aluminum manufacturers can produce the same
amount of output with fewer workers.
Next we study trends in output. Again, output
data are not available at the state level, so we look
at national trends. Specifically, Figure 5 contains
information on value of shipments (in 2006 dollars)
using data from the Census Bureau. The data

contain five categories of aluminum production.
The NAICS code for extrusions is combined with
the NAICS code for other aluminum rolling and
drawing, although extrusions makes up nearly 90
percent of this combined category during the time
period when both categories are reported separately
(1997 to 2001). The Census Bureau combines die-cast
and non-die-cast foundries into a single foundries
category.
Figure 5 illustrates that the value of shipments
has declined for most aluminum sectors since 1988,
at least at the national level. Sheet, plate, and foil
shipments have increased in value since 2003; by
2006 the value had reached the levels of the late
1990s. The value of castings shipments peaked in
1996, declined substantially in 1997, and declined
since 2002. Extrusions have remained relatively
constant over the time period, with a value between
5 and 8 billion dollars. Secondary production of
aluminum, largely from scrap, has increased from
4.5 billion dollars in 2003 to 7.0 billion dollars in
2006 for an increase of more than 50 percent from
2003 levels. In contrast, primary production has
decreased by half over the period, from 12 billion
dollars in 1988 to 6 billion dollars in 2006.

IV. Safety
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics recently
began producing safety statistics as the state level.
Therefore, we briefly consider the safety of the

Figure 4: Productivity in U.S. Aluminum Industry
160

Output per Worker-1997=100

140
120
100
80
60
Production and Processing

40

Foundries

20
0
1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

Year

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

38

Center for Business and Economic Research

The Aluminum Industry in Kentucky
Figure 5: Value of Shipments for U.S. Aluminum Industry

Billions of 2006 Dollars

25
20
15
10
5
0
1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

Year
Primary Production

Secondary Production

Extrusions

Sheet, Plate, Foil

Castings

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
aluminum industry in Kentucky. Table 1 contains
the illness and injury rate per 10,000 full time
workers. Again, the BLS has two categories of
interest: “Alumina and Aluminum Production and
Processing” and “Nonferrous metal foundries”. In
addition, we report the illness and injury rate for
all Kentucky jobs as a reference point. The table
shows that aluminum production in Kentucky
has a much lower illness and injury rate than the
statewide average for all jobs; however, the rate has
been rather volatile over the period. It was at 155.7
illnesses and injuries in 2003, compared with 35.6
in 2004. By 2006, the rate had increased to 85.6. In
contrast, the statewide rate was between 150 and
200 for all four years.
In contrast, foundries had a much higher

illness and injury rate, both compared to aluminum
production and compared to the statewide average
for all jobs. The rate for foundries was at 550.2 for
2004, which translates into a rate of 5.5 percent. In
other words, an average of 5.5 percent of foundries
workers in Kentucky had an illness or injury in
2004.2 The illness and injury rate had fallen by
half to 283.1 illnesses / injuries per 10,000 full time
workers by 2006.
The right half of the table contains the same
statistics for the U.S. rather than for just Kentucky.
The illness and injury rate for aluminum production
is lower in Kentucky than in the U.S. from 2004 to
2006; in fact, the rate in Kentucky is half the U.S.
average rate. From this statistic, however, we
cannot tell why the rate is lower. For example,

Table 1: Injury and Illness Rate per 10,000 Full Time
Workers in Kentucky and U.S.
Year

Kentucky
Aluminum Foundries
2003
155.7
2004
35.6
550.2
2005
74.8
416.9
2006
85.6
283.1

All
191
183.9
178
150

U.S.
Aluminum Foundries
149.1
260.3
115.7
282.4
171.1
289.5
155.4
253.2

Source: Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, U.S. Census Bureau
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All
150
141.3
135.7
127.8
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Table 2: Median Days Lost for Kentucky and U.S. Workers
Kentucky
Aluminum Foundries
Year
2003
14
2004
11
4
2005
7
4
2006
30
2

All
6
7
7
8

Aluminum
12
16
7
8

U.S.
Foundries
7
9
5
7

Source: Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, U.S. Census Bureau

Kentucky aluminum producers may specialize in
the production of types of aluminum that have
lower illness and injury rates, such as sheet, plate,
and foil. Another possibility is that Kentucky
factories have the same production mix as the U.S.
average but for some reason have fewer illnesses
and injuries due to better equipment, more safetyconscious employees, luck, etc. Kentucky foundries
had higher illness and injury rates than the national
average in 2004 and 2005, but Kentucky rate is
slightly lower in 2006. Finally, when we look at
all jobs, we see that Kentucky has a higher illness
and injury rate than the national average, and this
difference has persisted in every year from 2003 to
2006. At the national level, illness and injury rates
have declined every year for each of the categories
reported in the table.
Although the illness and injury rate tells us
about the likelihood of a worker becoming ill or
injured, it says nothing about the severity of the
ailment. Table 2 contains the median number of
days missed for the same set of industries and
locations as in Table 1. Aluminum production in
Kentucky has a high and volatile number of median
days lost, ranging from seven days in 2005 to 30 days
in 2006. With the exception of 2005, these numbers
are much higher than the average of all jobs, either
in Kentucky or in the U.S. The numbers are also a
lot higher than for the U.S. average for aluminum
production. Thus, even though the aluminum
production jobs had fewer illnesses or accidents than
the rest of the nation or than the average Kentucky
job, the duration of illness or injury is much longer
for Kentucky aluminum production. Thus, the
overall effect on total number of days away from
work is unclear: fewer workers are away from work
but, once away, they miss more days of work.
In Table 2, we see that foundries have lower
median days lost in comparison to aluminum
production or to the average Kentucky job. The
median number of days missed is between two and
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All
8
7
7
7

four days. This number is lower than for aluminum
production or for the average in Kentucky or for
the national averages for foundries, aluminum
production, or all jobs. Again, however, the total
days missed is unclear, since foundries have more
absences of shorter duration. Hopefully, the BLS
will provide such information in the future.

V. Conclusion
Kentucky’s aluminum industry has shown
mixed signals in the last few years. Employment
has held relatively constant except for a dramatic
decline in die-cast foundries. Average annual pay
has been relatively constant, when measured in real
terms, except for a huge decrease for foundries other
than die-cast. At the national level, productivity
has increased substantially since 2001. On the other
hand, the value of shipments has decreased for most
segments of the aluminum industry.
The data on safety in Kentucky’s aluminum
industry is unclear. Although primary production
has fewer illnesses and injuries compared to the
national average, the median number of days missed
is higher. Conversely, Kentucky’s foundries have
a higher number of worker injuries and illness, but
the median number of days missed per incident is
lower.
With the recent economic downturn, the
near future for Kentucky’s aluminum industry is
concerning. Kentucky’s manufacturing employment
in general has declined substantially in recent
months. Troubles in the automotive industry
will affect Kentucky, as the state is heavily vested
in building automobiles and providing parts for
automobiles, including aluminum-based parts.
The size and length of the downturn in Kentucky’s
aluminum industry is unclear, but it clearly depends
on the national economy and the manufacturing
component of it in particular.
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(Endnotes)
1
In the summer of 2008, Kentucky had two
primary aluminum smelters: Alcan’s facility in Robards
and Century Aluminum’s facility in Hawesville.
2
This rate assumes that each worker is injured
at most one time per year.
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KAM Business Manufacturing
Confidence Survey
Anna Laura Stewart
The Kentucky Business Manufacturing confidence survey is produced annually through the
joint efforts of the Kentucky Association of Manufacturers and the Center for Business and
Economic Research. The survey asks businesses to report on their actual performance over the
past year and to make predictions for the next year in areas such as employment, sales, profits,
capital expenditures and industrial production. Among other findings, the 2008 survey shows
the lowest levels of performance and expectation for the future in the history of this survey. This
is consistent with the downturn in the U.S. economy. Last year’s report showed an expected
downturn in the economy, the first downturn in many years. But even the projected downturn
did not predict the current decline. Problems affecting the overall growth of the state and national
economy include the tightening of the credit market and a fall in consumer confidence. Given
the current volatility of the economy, it is difficult to predict the economic environment for
manufacturers and whether their expectations will coincide with the reality of the economy in 2009.

Introduction
This annually released report on business
confidence in the manufacturing sector is the sixth
in an on-going partnership between the Kentucky
Association of Manufacturers (KAM) and the
University of Kentucky’s Center for Business and
Economic Research (CBER). This study focuses
on several performance indicators such as sales,
employment and profit. This year the outlook for
all of these measures are at their lowest levels since
CBER began producing the business confidence
survey. No more than a third of respondents expect
to experience growth in any of the above measures
and two-thirds of respondents expect either no
change or a decline. A continuing downward
trend is expected for the manufacturing sector in
Kentucky.
Data for this report represents the results
compiled from the 2008 KAM Business Confidence
Survey along with data from earlier reports
based on previous years’ surveys. The survey
was administered in October and November of
2008. Surveys were sent to 2,085 Kentucky-based
manufacturing establishments with at least 15 fulltime employees. Businesses were asked to answer
questions about their experience in the previous year
and their expectations for the next year. This year,
over 25% of surveys (545) were returned. While this
is a substantial number of surveys it should be kept
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in mind that the results of these surveys are for a
subset of all manufacturing firms and findings may
not apply to all of them.
Our 25% response rate is a significant increase
from last year’s survey where we obtained a response
rate of 18%. Also, the absolute number of surveys
increased from 317 to 545. Firms that returned
the surveys employ over 56,666 workers, which is
approximately 23% of all manufacturing workers
in Kentucky. Ninety-two counties were represented
in returned surveys, 77% of all Kentucky counties.
The mean and median size of survey respondents
in 2008 were 105 and 50 employees respectively.
The largest firm had over 6,000 employees. The
difference in the mean and median implies that
there are a few large firms interspersed among
the majority of establishments throughout the
state – thus the typical responding firm has about
50 employees.1 Responding firms reported sales
of over 10.5 billion dollars. Figure 1 shows the
location of responding firms by Area Development
District (ADD). As expected most respondents are
located in more densely populated areas; the most
notable concentration of these firms occurs in the
“urban triangle” of Lexington, Louisville, and the
Cincinnati Metropolitan Statistical Area. These areas
are represented by the KIPDA, Northern Kentucky,
and Bluegrass ADDs in Figure 1. Responding
1 Data on employment and sales are from the Selectory® database compiled by Dun and Bradstreet.
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Figure 1: Business Location by Area Development District

establishments are also primarily located near I-64,
I-71 and I-75, but a number of establishments are
also located along I-24, I-65, Bluegrass Parkway
and the Western Kentucky Parkway. Thirty-six
percent of respondents are members of the Kentucky
Association of Manufacturers.
Manufacturing establishments were asked
to report on their performance over the past 12
months2 and to speculate about their performance
over the next 12 months. Respondents are asked
about a number of different measures designed
to capture their overall economic activity This
report concentrates primarily on firm responses
regarding employment, sales, and, to a lesser extent,
profits, capital expenditures and productivity in
their industry. For each economic measure, firms
responded by indicating whether they experienced
either a/an “decrease,” “no change,” or “increase.”
Likewise, the respondents chose from the same three
options to express their expectations for their firms’
performance over the next year.
The next section provides a general discussion
about the economic environment of Kentucky’s
manufacturing sector in 2008. The report continues
by examining the recent downward trend in
2 Establishments were surveyed in October, so the previous year
should be treated as September 2007 to 2008 and the next year
from September 2008 to 2009 .
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economic factors affecting the industry. The section
to follow further details firm performance in 2008
and compares this to information about firms’ 2007
performance. Subsequent are sections discussing
firm expectations for performance in 2009. We
conclude with a brief summary of the economic
trends of Kentucky’s manufacturing industry and
commentary on likely influential factors affecting
the sector’s current performance and future
prospects.

2008 Statewide Performance

Last year’s business confidence survey showed
concern about the economy. This year’s survey
of manufacturers shows that they were right to
be concerned and that the outlook for next year
continues to be bleak. It should be kept in mind
that this is a survey of business confidence and is
reflecting the opinions of leaders of manufacturing
firms.
In this report we focus on three areas of business
performance that are of particular interest. These are
sales, employment and profit. In the 2007 report a
plurality of firms experienced an increase in all these
measures. This year decreases predominated in all
three areas. Also, for all three areas a significant
downward trend is expected to continue in the
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Table 1: Firm Performance in 2008
Decrease

No Change

Increase

Employment

48%

32%

20%

Sales

55%

14%

31%

Profits

58%

14%

28%

Capital Expenditures

33%

40%

26%

Industry Production

60%

22%

18%

new percentage. This percentage is then multiplied
by 100. Index numbers below 50 suggest a decline
of the measure, such as employment and sales over
the period; while values greater than 50 suggest
improvements in the measure (an index value equal
to 50 implies neither growth nor decline on net.)
Sales
Table 3 shows diffusion index for sales values
across the Area Development Districts for 2007 and
2008. Thirteen out of 15 ADDs had values below
50 points.
Big Sandy, Buffalo Trace and Kentucky River

manufacturing industry in Kentucky. Table 1
reports the performance of each of the surveyed
areas during 2008 for the Kentucky manufacturing
sector.

Table 2: Firm Performance 2007-2008 Comparison
Decrease

No Change

Increase

2007

2008

Change

2007

2008

Change

2007

2008

Change

Employment

32%

48%

16%

29%

32%

3%

39%

20%

-19%

Sales

35%

55%

20%

15%

14%

-1%

50%

31%

-19%

Profits

40%

58%

18%

20%

14%

-6%

41%

28%

-13%

Capital Expenditures

17%

33%

16%

40%

40%

0%

43%

26%

-17%

Industry Production

40%

60%

60%

24%

22%

-2%

36%

18%

-18%

ADDs are among districts with the least density
To illustrate the changes from the previous
of firms resulting in less significant declines or
year, Table 2 compares firm performance in 2008 to
insufficient data to calculate a value. Similarly,
the previous year. This table shows that for every
the Gateway ADD is a relatively less dense
measure of economic performance significantly
manufacturing region. So, while this District shows
fewer firms expect an increase while significantly
more firms expect to see a decrease in the
Table 3: Sales Index by Area Development
measure.
Districts for 2007 and 2008
Another way to compare performance
over time is through a diffusion index. ADD District
2008 Index
2007 Index
Change
This type of index is used when “No
Barren River
38
71
-33
Change” is a possible choice in addition to
Big Sandy
N/A
N/A
“Increase” and “Decrease.” If “Increase”
Bluegrass
35
65
-30
and “Decrease” are the only options then a
Buffalo Trace
36
50
-14
change in one implies a change in the other.
36
61
-25
If “No Change” is an option, however, Cumberland Valley
FIVCO
50
88
-38
a change in one does not necessarily
23
25
-2
mean a change in the other. A diffusion Gateway
Green
River
38
88
-50
index allows a more direct comparison
33
N/A
of increases and decreases when “No Kentucky River
Change” is a choice by equally dividing the KIPDA
40
77
-37
“No Change” responses and adding one Lake Cumberland
31
50
-19
half to “Increase” responses and one half Lincoln Trail
24
65
-41
to “Decrease” responses. “Increases” and Northern Kentucky
44
85
-41
“Decrease” responses are then divided by Pennyrile
42
71
-29
the total number of responses to arrive at a Purchase
40
75
-35
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a decline had already occurred in the employment
Table 4: Employment Index by Area
Development Districts for 2007 and 2008 index in 2007.
ADD District

2008 Index

2007 Index

Change

Barren River

50

50

0

Big Sandy

N/A

N/A

Bluegrass

32

61

-29

Buffalo Trace

33

67

-34

Cumberland Valley

35

61

-26

FIVCO

33

63

-30

Gateway

14

50

-36

Green River

40

79

-39

Kentucky River

N/A

N/A

KIPDA

42

67

-25

Lake Cumberland

33

50

-17

Lincoln Trail

21

68

-47

Northern Kentucky

34

58

-24

Pennyrile

42

67

-25

Purchase

41

54

-13

Two other performance areas are also
particularly illustrative, profits and industry
production. In 2008, only 28% of respondents
reported an increase in profits. This is compared
to 40.9% in 2007. Similarly, respondents reporting
an increase in production in the industry dropped
to 18% in 2008 from 35.9% in 2007.

Historical Data

Figure 2 shows the performance of Kentucky
manufacturers for the past 10 years using the
diffusion index. Note that the survey samples for
the years 1999 to 2002 and 2005 to 2006 include
both KAM and non-KAM members. However,
the samples surveyed from 2003 to 2004 include
only KAM members.
Indicators for 2008 for sales and employment
are at their lowest levels since CBER began
producing the business confidence survey. This
indicates the size of the economic downturn.
Reports of a decline in both sales and employment
are consistent with the downturn in the national
economy. In Figure 2, both indices dropped
precipitously over the past year. Similar to last
year, the sales index remains slightly above the
employment index.

an index of 23, this is only a slight decline from the
previous year. In districts with larger concentrations
of manufacturing firms, such as the ADDs in
Central and Northern Kentucky, the value of the
diffusion index more likely reflects the average
trend of the typical manufacturing establishment
in the region.
Employment
Table 4 shows the distribution of employment
index values across the Area Development Districts
using both the 2007 and 2008 data.
Twelve of the ADDs reported a decrease in
employment (index value under 50). One district,
Barren River ADD, had an index of 50 indicating
no change in employment over this period. Since
the Barren River District has relatively less of a
manufacturing establishment density, however, it
is less likely to reflect the actual trends in the region
than ADDs with higher levels of manufacturing.
The decrease in employment from 2007 to 2008 is
less severe compared to sales. This is in part because

Firm Expectations for 2009

In this section we examine the firms’ expectations
for 2009. In 2007 we noted a decline in optimism
compared to previous years of the survey. This
year expectations have dropped even further. Last
year still saw an expectation of an increase in sales
for this year. Something that, as noted above, did
not occur.
Table 5 shows firm expectations for the coming
year. All of the measures in the table show expected

Table 5: Firm Expectations for 2009 and Comparison with 2008 Expectations
Expected Decrease

Expected No Change

Expected Increase

2009

2008

Change

2009

2008

Change

2009

2008

Change

Employment

38%

15%

23%

42%

45%

-3%

21%

41%

-20%

Sales

43%

17%

26%

23%

28%

-5%

34%

55%

-21%

Profits

44%

16%

28%

23%

33%

-10%

33%

51%

-18%

Capital Expenditures

35%

19%

16%

44%

45%

-1%

20%

36%

-16%

Industry Production

53%

24%

29%

27%

38%

-11%

20%

38%

-18%
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Figure 2: Manufacturing Sector Performance in Selected Indicators
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decrease in growth. The table also shows the
percentages from 2008
As seen in Table 5, respondents are much
more pessimistic. There has been a significant
change in outlook for the near future. Although
expectations were down in 2007, there was still
some question as to how widespread manufacturer’s
pessimistic predictions were. There is little room
left for speculation, however, in the expectations of
manufacturer’s for 2009. No more than a third of
respondents expect to experience growth in any of
these measures while over two-thirds of respondents
expect either no change or a decline in each of these
measures. This is not unexpected given the recent
downward trend in the economy.
This year the percentages of firms expecting
to increase employment, sales, profits, capital
expenditures and industry production fell
significantly from last year’s predicted values.
For employment, this reduction was a decline of
20 percentage points, significantly greater than the
previous years decline of 3.5 percentage points; for
sales the decline was 21 percentage points; for profits
the decline was 18 percentage points; for capital
expenditures the decline was 16 percentage points;
and in industrial production the decline was 18
percentage points. Similarly, the percentage of firms
expecting a decrease in employment, sales, profits,
capital expenditures, and industry production rose
from last year’s expectations. The number of firms
expecting a decrease in employment in 2009 rose
from 15% for 2008 to 38% and those expecting a
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decrease in sales rose from 17% to 43%. Similarly,
the number of firms expecting a decrease in profits
in 2009 rose from 16% to 44%, in capital expenditures
from 19% to 35% and in Industry production from
24% to 53%. For many of these categories, the
number of firms expecting a decline more than
doubled over the course of a year.

Additional Survey Questions

Additional questions were asked in this year’s
survey to gather more information on issues
pertinent to manufacturers. The first question
asked whether the company is planning to invest
in capital in order to improve the efficiency of
their production. In spite of the expected decrease
in capital expenditures fifty-eight percent of
respondents said that “yes” they were planning on
making at least some capital investments to improve
efficiency of production.
The strength of this response in these difficult
economic times may come from a perception that
the savings from efficient production techniques
may outweigh the expenditures for the necessary
capital.
The next questions related to the experience
firms have with the impact of the policies of
Kentucky State Government on their businesses.
When asked if their business was being helped by
Kentucky’s State Government 80% of respondents
answered no, 20% yes. When asked if their business
was being hurt by Kentucky State Government 60%
said no and 40% said yes. Given that the majority of
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firms responded that Kentucky’s State government
neither helped or hurt their businesses may reflect
a perception of manufacturing firms that their
businesses are not largely impacted by Kentucky
State Government Policies.

Conclusions

The results of the 2008 Kentucky Association
of Manufacturers Business Confidence Survey
show a sharp decline in business performance and
expectations of future performance. Last year’s
report indicated that conditions were unlikely
to improve in 2008 and this report has largely
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substantiated that prediction.
The sharp decline in expectations should not be
surprising given the current economic downturn.
Economic factors such as a tightening credit
market and falling consumer confidence are likely
affecting both manufacturing production and the
expectations of manufacturers about future growth.
The volatility of the current economic situation
makes it difficult to say with any certainty whether
manufacturer’s expectations will come to fruition. It
is unlikely, however, that a significant improvement
in the economic environment will occur in the near
future.
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